CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC LIBRARY

THEOLOGY

VOL. XXXVIII JANUARY, 1939 No. 223

EDITORIAL

WITH this number THEOLOGY appears in a new format and under new editorship, and it is appropriate that something should be said, both in retrospect and in prospect, about its objects. It was founded in 1920. Edited until 1933 by the Dean of Winchester and from then until now by the Dean of Exeter, it has proved its value as a witness to historic Christianity and as an organ of contemporary Christian thought. The new editor has been a regular and grateful reader from the early days. At least, he thought that this had been the case; but recently, in the course of a careful perusal of the whole series of volumes, he found so many notable contributions, of which he had no memory, that he was forced to doubt the regularity of his reading! At the same time, this perusal of THEOLOGY from the beginning has impressed upon him the strength of the tradition which he has inherited, a tradition which clearly must be maintained. He would shrink from the task, if he were not assured of the collaboration of many who have written for THEOLOGY in the past as well as of others who have not. Old readers will like to know that we hope to continue the features of the review which they have valued, and indeed to revive some which have lapsed. One feature, unfortunately, cannot be continued. We know that the Dean of Exeter's editorials will be missed. The new editor, in his undergraduate days, learned his first lessons in theology from Dr Carpenter, and he has not forgotten them; but the rare qualities, which have given distinction to the editorials, can be neither learned nor reproduced.

* * * * *

New readers, however, will be more interested in the present and the future of THEOLOGY than in its past, and will desire some more explicit information about our aims. This we shall try to supply, though it would be premature at this stage to launch out upon a comprehensive statement of policy. The following will serve, we hope, as an

v.38-39 1939

adequate, though not as an exhaustive, definition of our aims:

(*a*) To provide a medium through which all that is best in contemporary theology may reach the clergy, the laity, and those outside the Church who are looking towards Christianity for a reasonable and relevant faith;

(*b*) to serve as an organ where Anglican writers with different associations and various special interests may meet and contribute to the clarification and exposition of the faith which has their allegiance;

(*c*) to serve as a liaison between theological thought and those movements in contemporary literature, art and political philosophy which are working towards a re-discovery of the significance of the Christian tradition.

Each of these aims calls for some commentary.

* * * * *

While we intend to publish articles and reviews that are informed by scholarship, we do not aim at being a periodical which publishes technical studies that can be appreciated only by specialist students of theology. Such periodicals are, of course, indispensable, but our aim is rather the interpretation of technical theology to a wider circle. It is probable that hitherto THEOLOGY has drawn most of its readers from the parochial clergy. We shall continue to give full attention to their special needs; at the same time it will be our aim in future to interpret theology in such a way as to engage the interest and to provoke the thinking of the layman, and this, if rightly done, ought to be of service to the clergy too. We believe that there is an increasing number of laymen who are aware that the fundamental questions to which we are ultimately being driven back are in this as in every age theological questions, which can be answered only in the light of historic Christianity. They may not yet call the questions "theological"; and it is not easy for them to find theology expounded and interpreted in a language and a style that speak to their need. But it is theology that is needed; no popular or superficial substitutes will do, and therefore we deliberately retain THEOLOGY as our title. We realize, however, that this title will not commend itself at once to many of the readers whose

interest we hope to secure. For this reason, among others, we are going to publish during the coming year a series of articles by different writers which will be designed to explain what theology is, its subject-matter, its methods, its import, and its relation to other disciplines of the mind. The first of these articles, which serves as an introduction to the series, appears in this number.

* * * * *

Sooner or later it becomes clear that Christian theology cannot be achieved in isolation; it is essentially a communal undertaking. Theology carries with it the implication of churchmanship, of belonging to the Christian community. In principle this connexion is more readily acknowledged today than it was a generation or even a few years ago; but its practical application still presents grave difficulties to many who see its point. What kind of churchmanship is essential? Theology is a concern and an activity of the universal Church; here, if anywhere, insularity and provincialism are out of place. We hope to discuss in our pages work of theological importance that is being done abroad. In the future as in the past, we shall welcome contributions from members of other communions. Nevertheless, THEOLOGY will remain what it has always been, a definitely Anglican journal. "We believe," wrote the editor in the first number, "that a monthly periodical really representative of the life and thought of our Communion has been much needed: it remains to be seen whether we can meet the need." THEOLOGY has never been the official organ of any party in the Church of England. Nor will it become that under its present editorship. It will retain its independence. Of course no review, without aspiring to become an encyclopædia, can hope to be fully representative; but we reaffirm the original intention in this matter. We would add that we address ourselves, in the first place, to the growing number of Anglican churchmen who desire to work for a reassertion of the Christian tradition, not on sectional lines, but in conjunction with all who regard membership in the Church as itself the fundamental bond of union.

* * * * *

The original aims of THEOLOGY included the intention of showing "a catholic, if discriminating, sympathy with every genuine movement of man's spirit—in literature, art

336355

and music, as well as in religion and scientific study." Only considerations of emphasis and space, it was said, would limit the expression of this sympathy. The expression of it has by no means been neglected, but circumstances, we believe, now warrant us in giving more emphasis and space to this range of interests than has so far been found possible. We intend regularly to publish articles which direct attention to trends in contemporary literature and culture which are of theological importance, and to bring theological judgment to bear upon non-theological movements and books. Behind this intention lies the conviction that our existence in modern society is forcing upon us moral and spiritual decisions to the implications of which Christian thought and imagination are scarcely yet alive. Because the need for making these decisions is coming upon us later in England than elsewhere and in a form which conceals their ultimate effect, it is still possible to ignore what is really happening. The secularization of society is disguised because the external form of traditional Christian institutions survives and there is no overt attack upon them. Christian thinking like Christian living is difficult enough in any historical situation. In the present situation the most sensitive minds are wondering how much longer there will be a real opportunity for either. The ever-widening gulf between the actualities of modern society and the affirmations of the Christian faith, and the apparent irrelevance of what is said and done in church to what is said and done outside, are illustrated in the articles which we publish this month from the pens of the Archdeacon of Northumberland and Miss Chester. They raise theological questions of a kind to which this review must give unremitting attention. Those who are in touch with the lines on which the Oxford conference on Church, Community and State is being followed up will be aware of the wide range of questions which in this connexion are pressing for consideration. In spite of all that has been written about the bearing of the Christian faith on modern society, we believe that there is need for a more searching diagnosis of the situation than has as yet been undertaken. We shall welcome contributions which help to meet this need. THEOLOGY will not be used as a propagandist organ for any secular solution of the present crisis in Christian culture. From the theological standpoint the present crisis is in fact no more, and no less, than the

form in which our generation must experience the permanent crisis that characterizes the relation of the world to God. It is the function of theology to see and to declare the truth about this permanent crisis, and to interpret the truth in the context of our contemporary situation.

* * * * *

Such are the chief aims that we shall keep before us with a full consciousness that anything like a complete achievement of them is impossible. It remains to add a few remarks on points of detail. Our present plan is to publish each month five articles, which shall as far as possible deal in due proportion with the various interests that we aim at serving. Then there will be two (or more) " surveys," one of recent English books on a certain type of subject and the other of trends in the thought or literature of a country abroad. There will be comments on periodicals, literary as well as theological, also, of course, reviews of separate books, and finally a list of all books received during the preceding month. The section headed " Miscellanea," which provides scope for a variety of shorter notes, will be continued. Further developments are under consideration. If our circulation increases, as naturally we hope it will, we shall be able to increase the size of the review and so to make room for more matter and for other features.

* * * * *

We are glad to be able to publish the notes, which will be found in this month's " Miscellanea " section, on Christian duty in the event of war. There are some—Christians as well as non-Christians—who speak as though everything that can possibly be said about the so-called pacifist issue has already been said, and as though it is idle now to continue the debate. We sympathize with this feeling, but we refuse to admit that Christian thought has exhausted all its resources or to acquiesce in the inference that for Christians there is no other course open than a final agreement to differ. It may well be futile to argue the question further with any who, convinced that they have sounded it to its depths, have made up their minds and anticipate no further illumination. But those whose thinking on this subject has not yet reached its term will continue to believe that, as long as Christians who accept or ought to accept the same premisses arrive at contradictory

conclusions, there must somewhere be error which further reflection will correct. In most discussions of pacifism it is easy enough to see how error may creep in, however difficult it may be to fix on the exact spot where it does so. The word "pacifist" itself is commonly used to cover so many inconsistent points of view as to be a positive hindrance to clear thinking and an inevitable source of confusion. In any case, we do not allow that the most significant division between persons is whether or not they are prepared in any circumstances to take part in war. For unwillingness to do that may be based on a considerable variety of grounds, some of which are certainly unchristian. The most significant division between persons is whether or not they believe in God and acknowledge the intrinsic authority of the Christian standard of values.

The Need for Theology

THE series of articles on theology, to which this serves as an introduction, was planned in what now seems almost like the fool's paradise of a quiet early September afternoon. Since that date certain things have happened. Of the nature of these events, and of their effects on the life of the Church in this country, and still more in Europe and the mission field, this is not the place to speak. The Christian judgment, like the secular, is still obviously unbalanced by the shock of those days: it is only to be hoped that it will show itself more quick to grasp the significance of some of the consequences than the secular judgment appears to be.

But there is one effect of the dénouement so obvious as to demand mention. It would be difficult to think of anything less relevant, in the popular estimation, to the needs of this critical situation than a series of articles on the subject of theology. There are many things which are being urged upon us as being necessary to salvation. In the political sphere we are bidden to rearm, to set ourselves to recover national unity and discipline, to secure as rapidly as possible a change of government, to reconstruct our economic life in terms which would amount to a social revolution. From the side of religion we are urged to make the most of the genuine, if transient and confused, stirring of men's spiritual response which marked the crisis: we are called upon to dedicate ourselves to prayer and service, and God knows that these are tasks to which we need to give ourselves with a new intensity of intelligent devotion. But in the community as a whole, and, it must be confessed, in considerable sections of the Church itself, the suggestion that our deepest need is the recovery of a truly Christian theology would be received with impatience, if not with ridicule.

In his study of the life of Henry VIII. Professor Pollard makes this comment on the dissolution of the monasteries. "(It) harmonized with the secular principles of the predominant classes. The monastic ideal of going out of the world to seek something which cannot be measured in terms of pounds, shillings and pence is abhorrent to a busy industrial age; *and any principle is hated most at the time when it is most needed.*" Theology may not be hated, but it is at least despised or ignored. It is worth asking whether its present position may not be another illustration of the truth contained in that penetrating phrase.

Consider, first, certain aspects of the condition of religion in this country. No man who observes with any close attention the life of the Church, whether in town or country, can fail to be struck by one fact, the disproportion between the energy and devotion which are being put into the concern, and the results forthcoming in spiritual effectiveness. In any diocese, in parishes of every kind, from the poorest slum conditions to the heights of residential comfort, there is to be found among clergy and laity alike a wealth of devotion to the service of the Church, a continuous expenditure of time and thought in the maintenance and planning of its work. There are indeed parishes where this is not true: there are clergy who have lost heart and are doing little or nothing. But these are the minority. Broadly speaking, it is true that the Church of England was never a more hardworking concern than it is to-day.

And yet the impression is forced upon us that the return on all this expenditure is, taken as a whole, disappointingly small. The direct evangelistic influence of the average parish, its capacity to break new ground, to tap new springs of spiritual life, is notoriously weak. The influence of the Church as a whole upon the life of the community, its power to speak in the name of the national conscience, to direct or control the public mind in questions of domestic or foreign policy which involve plain moral issues, is, behind the façade of the establishment, even weaker.

How is this state of affairs to be explained? The strength of the Church is being largely dissipated because it does not possess that sense of spiritual proportion which could direct the energy generated by good-will and hard work into the channels that really matter. Put it this way. Look at the picture of the nature of God which is given us in the Bible, Old and New Testament together: Righteousness (Justice), Truth, Love: look out at the world as it is at the moment: consider what, God being what He is, are the issues with which He must be most deeply concerned: and then ask whether the Church as we know it, locally or generally, has really got its mind focussed and its energy directed upon these issues. Are our consciences awake and sensitive to the denials in the life of classes and nations of the elementary demands of righteousness? Are our minds alert and active to meet the intellectual bewilderment and revolt of those to whom greater opportunity of education, or bitter experience of life, has made the traditional ortho-

doxy and piety almost meaningless? Does our heart burn within us when we remember the way in which Christians think and speak of one another within the same parish, within the same communion, within the universal Church of Christ? Are these the things which are uppermost in our minds when we think of the nature and function of the Church? If they are not, there is something radically wrong. And what is wrong is the lack of a true theology, of right thinking about God.

Take another illustration. This loss of proportion, and the misdirection of energy which follows from it, clearly produce serious consequences. One of the most serious of these is the growing divorce between the sacred and the secular, of which a grave symptom is the widening gap between the lay and the clerical outlook on life. This latter is bad enough in itself: but it is even worse as symptomatic of a tendency which is forcing religion more and more into the position of a departmental and specialized interest, the hobby of those who happen to prefer that to art or politics or mechanical invention, and, equally serious, is to all intents and purposes secularizing or excommunicating most of the occupations and interests by which the community lives, in which the majority of men find the fullest satisfaction of their powers.

No one would suggest that this is a purely modern problem. No one with any fairness of judgment would lay the whole blame at the door of the Church. But some of the blame must lie there. And when one asks how this disastrous divorce has come about, again the same answer suggests itself. Our theology, our understanding of the purpose of God in creation and redemption, is too narrow: it has become introverted, "ecclesiastical," unrealistic in its attempt to relate that purpose to the whole range of history and human activity.

There are many tasks to which the Church will have to set itself if it is to make good these defects. But it looks as if the most urgent of all is a fresh concentration upon that which underlies its teaching, its worship and its witness as a social force, its conception of God.

Consider the other side of the picture, the condition and attitude of large numbers of those who stand aloof from, or on the fringe of, the life of the Church. The writer of this article has had the good fortune to spend the greater part of his ordained life working among young men and

women who, in his experience, are in many cases ready and anxious to be interested in theology. They belong to the favoured class which has enjoyed the opportunity of advanced education. That advantage has no doubt developed their critical faculty and given them a greater power of articulate expression; but it has not separated them off from the rest of their contemporaries in offices and factories anything like so sharply as is sometimes supposed. The student body in our universities throughout the country is a very fair cross-section of the younger generation as a whole.

They suffer from the same mental and spiritual ills that are afflicting their generation, the loss of any sense of coherent purpose, the subjection to the de-personalizing influence of mass-produced civilization which slowly but steadily reduces the standing and worth of the individual as a moral agent, and the emotional strain, at once unnerving and exciting, of successive shocks to the structure of international morality and decency. They show the same signs of the effects of these influences; a premature cynicism and pessimism, a tendency to follow with unbalanced enthusiasm the political tendencies which seem to offer some immediate outlet in practical activity, a relapse into pleasure seeking, or a preoccupation with the mechanized interests which a scientific civilization provides with such profusion. They show also the signs of a vigorous resistance to these influences; a steadily increasing moral sensitiveness to the iniquity of needless suffering and waste in human life, an immense potential readiness for service and sacrifice if a cause worthy of it could present itself, a deep instinctive appreciation of and desire for a quality of personal life, an interior stability and power, which they know to be the only condition of survival under the strain of life as they will have to live it.

They are looking for a truth which will be a dynamic. We believe that Christian theology is that truth. But it will take a good deal of hard work to convince them of it.

The Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Christian Doctrine represents the labour of fifteen years on the part of a group of the ablest minds in the Church of England. Surely, it might be said, the work which you are asking for has been done: we have the results in our hands. The question is a pertinent one; and the attempt to answer it may throw a good deal of light on the question of what kind of theology it is that we need.

The Commission was appointed for a specific purpose, to determine the limits of doctrinal comprehensiveness within the Church. Its task was a technical one: and for the performance of it specialists were required. The result is inevitably, and properly, what I venture to call " specialist " theology. This is not to say that it is not valuable: it is essential as the foundation of any other kind of theological construction. It is not to say that it is not interesting to others than specialists: there are plenty of lay men and women who will find the report most enlightening and stimulating. The fact remains that the theology here presented is specialist in the sense that it presupposes and demands from its readers an already existing familiarity with the subject, and a very fair acquaintance with its history and terminology. Its contents will have to be mediated through minds which are used to working in a rather different material before they can be made accessible or acceptable to those who stand in the greatest need of what theology has to give. As they stand they would appear to most of these people to be typical of what they themselves suppose theology to be, a departmental subject.

What kind of language, then, must theology speak if it is to make itself heard and understood? In what temper must it approach the mind of this generation?

It must speak with conviction, with dogmatic conviction. It must present its message with something of the prophetic certainty of the Old Testament: " Thus saith the Lord." Its spokesman must in effect say: This word which I bring is not a theory which I have invented or constructed; it is not a " view," what Fr Kelly would call " one of my ideas," which I offer to you as an interesting speculation that well deserves to be considered alongside all the alternative theories. It is a revelation; it is something which has come to me, not indeed *in vacuo*, not without discipline and labour of mind and travail of soul, but equally not the " product " of that interior struggle. I cannot demonstrate its truth; I cannot coerce you into accepting it. I can only ask you to look at it, to set it over against you and let it make its impression on you. If you will do that, I believe that it will come home to you, as it has come home to me, as truth, absolute and saving.

Its content must be, I believe, the traditional content of Christian orthodoxy. It must start where the creed starts, with the reality of God. That is the only answer

to the mood of purposelessness — *mataiotes*, emptiness, aimlessness, is the New Testament word for it—which is the root of our moral paralysis. And here it must attempt two things, both essential, if it is to make any initial contact with the contemporary intellectual need.

It must set itself to give an intelligible rationale of the nature of "belief." That is the point at which many of the ablest and most willing minds are held up by a sheer inability to understand the nature of the mental act which they are asked to perform when they are asked to "believe," and by an honest inability to go further until they are satisfied on that point.

It must grapple with the question of Personality in God. Here most obviously it will need to rely on the spade-work of technical philosophical theology: but it must use the results of that spade-work not simply to satisfy the metaphysical demand of the few, but to counteract the sense of "lostness" in a universe of unimaginable size, and the submergence of personal values by the dominance of the machine.

Its second main task will be the vindication of Christian theology as rooted in history. It will have to substantiate that claim in face of a good deal of loose thinking due to the comparative study of religion, and to the abstractness of scientific thought. It will have to stand unhesitatingly for the exclusive definiteness of the Christian claim that the clue to the purpose of the whole creative process is given in that series of historical events which constitute the life of Jesus of Nazareth. Its doctrine of Incarnation, Redemption and Resurrection will have to be strictly historical in the sense that it insists upon these truths, not as general principles on which God acts, but as real events, things that God has done.

But it will fail, and precisely at the most crucial point, if it stops there in its interpretation of the life of Jesus. For it is just at this point that theology so often gives the impression of being merely a series of statements about a particular episode occurring in a distant past. The doctrines of Incarnation, Redemption and Resurrection are indeed truly significant only because they are the interpretation of actual historical fact. But as actual fact they are significant far beyond their reference to the individual life in which they occurred. They are seen as great luminous points in history whose beam lights up the nature of God's operation not only in that one instance, but wherever His action

touches the life of man. Human life A.D. is a different thing from human life B.C., not solely because of the work and influence of the individual, Jesus of Nazareth, but because in the light of that work and influence the true relation of God to man and of man to God is now discernible. "The taking up of human nature into God" is seen to be an event whose character radically affects man's status and our valuation of that status. "The breaking of the power of sin" is seen to be the demonstration of God's eternal method of dealing with the recalcitrant material of evil in human nature. "The resurrection of the body" is seen to be, in Dr Quick's words, the perfect illustration of the truth that "all the goodness of this world of our experience, a goodness achieved with such infinite labour, and still so inexplicably mingled with intolerable wrong and bitter disappointment (is) a treasure provided by God for sacrifice, so that through the sacrifice it should be recovered pure and glorified and whole."

Its third main undertaking, which is, of course, no more than the carrying through of the second to its conclusion, will be the vindication of the "continuous" character of the act of God in Incarnation, Redemption and Resurrection by the interpretation of the work of the Spirit in the Christian community. And here perhaps more directly than anywhere else a true theology will touch the realities of the particular age in which we are now living. For it is the doctrine of the Spirit-filled community which above all others is needed to satisfy man's desperate need of a principle of coherence for the very preservation of society. The fanatical loyalty so freely given to ideological communities is a pathetic witness to the depth of that need and, in its excesses, a terrible condemnation of the failure of a Church which has claimed from the first to possess the secret of that solidarity, and to be itself the creation of a power that can weld the fragmentary, diverse, rough-edged material of human nature into a fellowship of holy spirit.

We may have trespassed too far ahead upon the ground which will be covered in detail in the articles which will follow. But this much at least seemed necessary if we were to justify the original claim made for theology by indicating in outline its character and its relevance to our present situation.

If the diagnosis of this situation, both within and without the Church, is even partially true, what effect might such a

concentration upon theological thinking and teaching be expected to have upon it?

Its effects upon the existing Church membership may be stated under three heads.

(1) For clergy and laity alike it would involve a wholesome concentration upon one undertaking, which, almost outrageous as the assertion may seem, is, we believe, urgently necessary. It would force us all to face the question whether we really are Christians, and whether we know why we are Christians. The political systems which show the greatest power of holding and harnessing the allegiance of their followers, indulge from time to time in what they are pleased to call " purges." God forbid that the Christian Church, which once used methods almost as drastic to serve the same ends, should relapse into that kind of barbarism. But it is hard to deny the charge that the Church suffers very gravely at the present time from carrying too many passengers or, perhaps more exactly, too many persons of whom no one, including themselves, could say with certainty whether they were passengers or crew. On a fair-weather pleasure-trip such uncertainty may not seriously matter. In the kind of dirty weather into which we are unmistakably running it is going to matter quite considerably. There are few things which would do more to bring cohesion, power of decision, and striking force into the life of the Church than a stern concentration upon a few quite central and crucial questions of belief, and their implications. Within the next few decades the people who will matter, if the Christian cause is to be sustained, are the people who *know* that they believe in God, and something at least of what that belief implies in the hard realities of choice and action; the people who *know* in their own souls the fact of redemption, and are able to implement that knowledge in a loyalty to truth which will stand the strain of sacrifice and failure. A concentration on theology, true theology, would have the tonic effect of forcing us to ask ourselves what we do believe and why. Some of us might find that the sum total of our convictions was disconcertingly less than we had supposed. Others might find that it was hearteningly more. The result either way would be pure gain to all concerned.

(2) It would be an equally wholesome corrective to emotionalism in religion. The last thing that one would wish to do is to speak hardly or unfairly of any movement

which claims to be inspired by the Spirit of God, and can show some unmistakable evidence of the truth of that claim. But, especially in the temper of our time, movements which almost pride themselves on having no theology, and being able to do without it, are little short of a menace to true religion. And within the life of the Church itself that temptation is by no means always resisted. There are types of devotion, Catholic and Protestant, which are encouraged on the ground that they meet a popular need, which would find it hard to justify themselves if they submitted to a searching examination of their theological presuppositions.

(3) The third, and in some ways the most important, effect would be the effect upon the character and quality of our worship; but this is a point which I need not elaborate as it is dealt with at length in another article in this number.

The effects of a theological renaissance upon those who at present stand aloof from the Church would naturally be less immediate, but they would be no less valuable. Many of these are men and women of good will. They are as deeply concerned as we who call ourselves Christians about the state of the world and of man's soul. They are spending themselves, often with a devotion that puts us to shame, in work which in their judgment is more truly directed than "religious activities" to the promotion of what they believe to be the true ends of religion.

Some of them are living in the strength of a spiritual conviction which is absolutely real, though they would hesitate to call it Christian. Others are fighting that hardest of all losing battles, the struggle to go on serving humanity without any clear vision of why humanity is worth serving. Both of them are often enough very lonely.

To the former the clarification of theology, its statement in terms which showed it as a coherent interpretation of man's nature and destiny in the light of Christian faith, might well come as the one thing for which they have been waiting. For it might make it possible for them to come out of their isolation into the companionship of the Christian community.

To the latter it might, though more slowly and painfully, bring a similar liberation. It would take time. Rival interpretations of human life have taken such hold upon men's minds that it is only with some difficulty that they can bring themselves to a fresh, perhaps a first, consideration of the Christian view as a serious option. Nor is that the

whole story. The Christian Church has fallen so far behind, has so often seemed archaic, obscurantist, even dishonest in its presentation of truth, that it will have to work hard to remove the suspicion and misunderstanding with which its utterances are received. No short cuts are available. It is going to mean a long-term policy of theological rehabilitation.

F. A. Cockin.

The Moral Influence of Poetry

Poetry is often a kind of play, a deliberate juggling with the accidental properties of words, the marginal meanings and musical effects, and there is no more need to justify this kind of poetry than there is to justify the kind of poetry that recalls pleasant scenes and experiences. Indeed, the apology defeats its own end, for although play—activity without preconceived end—is the source of a great deal of discovery and enjoyment, it ceases to be play, and loses all its virtue, the moment we give it the dignity of a useful and purposive activity.

When the poet is actually writing he is seldom aware of any moral purpose, but when he has finished he likes to see a moral value in his work. He may amuse himself in playing with words, just as a workman can do a juggling act with his hammer in his dinner-hour; but as a rule he wants his art to be a useful instrument as well as a toy, and he feels that only a bad workman spends all his time balancing his hammer on the tip of his nose. At the very least he does not want to hinder the endless effort to keep our intellectual and moral sense alive and healthy; and often he would like to think his special talents served a useful purpose in the struggle.

Even the footballer and the crossword-puzzler have this hankering for moral justification; and to say that play loses its virtue if it becomes a self-conscious effort to keep fit is not to deny that genuine disinterested play does sometimes have a physical, intellectual or moral value, although that value can seldom be estimated as simply and directly as one might wish. The reading of poetry, for example, in so far as it influences our conduct, obviously has a moral effect, but the influence is seldom direct, and simple exhortation—

Be strong, be good, be pure—

does not do very much to help people to decide what action is strong, good or pure, nor is it on record that the downright assertion—

> Balfour is a gentleman,
> Asquith is a fool;
> Before he goes to Parliament
> He ought to go to school—

ever had much effect on the voting at Parliamentary elections, though no doubt it exhilarated one section of the electorate more than another.

At this point both poets and readers are often tempted to take a short cut. They begin to look for versified politics or ethics without first asking what special services poetry can render: they look for a musical and decorated statement of their own beliefs, they confuse their own approval of the sentiment of these political or religious hymns not only with the appreciation of poetry, but also with moral edification. Because they approve of what is said, they feel that they have learned something; they fail to notice that they have neither had their own interpretation of their beliefs deepened nor found an expression for them which might convince other people. Poetry has no value, either moral or political, unless it has a significance or a persuasiveness which vanishes when the poem is deprived of imagery and rhythm. One might almost say that the poet always fails if he knows what he is setting out to do before he puts pen to paper; and that the reader is enjoying the pleasure of recognition rather than moral or poetic experience if he reads a poem with deep satisfaction instead of fascinated disturbance.

Certainly it is *possible* for poetry to be direct and persuasive propaganda for moral and political ideas. The imagery and verbal music of the poem may be so attractive, and the underlying meaning or message may be so unobtrusive, that it is not until months later that the reader realizes that the poem has insensibly changed his ideas and prejudices. Byron's *Isles of Greece* is perhaps a poem of this kind, and it may have done something to shake people out of indifference or political hostility into sympathy with the movement for Greek independence. The picture of sunset over the islands fixes itself in the mind (for the line " All except their sun is set " produces this effect although it is really saying the opposite), and the reader finds himself assuming that human life in these islands is declining too. It is not the *statement* that makes him do this, but the image,

which, slowly taking root in the reader's mind, alters his whole apprehension of the underlying idea, so that at last he is willing to accept a statement which he previously rejected.

This kind of rhetoric may help the reader to overcome his own prejudices and give a sympathetic examination to doctrines which, stated in abstract simplicity, he instinctively dislikes, but the conclusion to which this use of rhetoric may lead needs to be scrutinized very carefully. Persuasive rhetoric is always justifiable, for even in the most abstract arguments we start with obscure and often unconscious prejudices about the terms we are using, and the prejudices need to be removed before we can make an honest judgment; but rhetoric can serve a bad cause as well as a good. It is not true that the Devil has all the best tunes, but he has a good many of those which commend themselves most readily to the unsophisticated ear, and he sometimes contrives to borrow a good tune to serve an ill cause.

The work of criticizing a doctrine and deciding the relevance of the rhetoric in which it is clothed is highly technical; and a nice complication is introduced by the fact that reading is often a substitute for practical activity, so that the reading of tales of crime and nastiness sometimes helps a man to remain a well-behaved citizen, whilst the addict of passionate uplift remains a smug and self-deceiving rogue.[1] This is perhaps a matter for the philosopher or the theologian rather than the literary critic; the point with which we are concerned in this essay is the moral influence of poetic technique. Is the use of a crude rhythm and ready-made imagery harmful even when it is used in what appears to be a good cause? If we are to answer this question we must consider for a moment the relation between poetry and the arts on the one hand and metaphysics and theology on the other.

Our knowledge of the spiritual world and our consequent knowledge of good and evil is based on direct spiritual perceptions, not on logical or mathematical operations. Rational theology can help us to detect personal errors and illusions, but if we mistake it for a demonstration of real existences it lapses into mere grammatical and etymological

[1] I am not arguing in favour of sadistic or pornographic literature; the fantasy-satisfaction given by such reading-matter seems to me to be socially useful but morally bad, and very different from real psychological sublimation.

deduction which does not convince anybody who is not convinced already. The professional sees so clearly the reality behind his own technical language and operations that he sometimes forgets that the perception of that reality does not come through the verbal technique but is prior to it. We have invented words like "immanent" *because* we have some knowledge of God, but it is not true that everybody knows these words, nor does anybody arrive at a belief in God through manipulating these words. You might as well deduce the existence of buttercups from the existence and known mutual relations of words like "calyx," "sepal" and "petal." You would not be *wrong*, but if you thought you could teach people to notice buttercups by such means you would be very silly. Botany *starts* with the buttercups, and theology with God.

Poetry, on the other hand, can sometimes give strength and definition to perceptions which the reader had only felt thinly and obscurely. Poetry is not a substitute for experience, but the sensuous effects of poetry sometimes focus attention and sensibility on some part of experience that people have overlooked.

The perceptions presented or enhanced or clarified through poetry need to be criticized in the light of reason and experience (poets, like metaphysicians, demonstrate the existence of the unicorn "in a certain sense"), but the fact that poetry can go wrong does not mean that we can afford to do without it. The poetic use of words is often a nuisance to the philosopher, but the philosopher who leaves undeveloped within himself the kind of experience that is expressed in *Hamlet* or in Coleridge's *Ode to Dejection* is starving the roots from which philosophy can grow.

Poetry cannot take the place of rational theology or philosophy, but it may be a useful and necessary ally, and, whereas the philosopher is concerned with the relations between the things we perceive, it is the business of the literary critic to consider the *quality* of the perceptions and sentiments that we express in words, and the evocative efficacy of the language used to express them. Every outlook implies not only a certain group of ideas and a set determination to influence circumstances in a particular direction, but also a certain sensibility and a certain way of feeling about new situations as they arise; and whereas the criticism of ideas belongs to the province of the philosopher and the theologian, the discussion of sentiments, in so far

as those sentiments are expressed in words, comes within the field of literary criticism.

Philosopher and literary critic begin with different qualifications and focus their attention on different points; but the distinction between thought and feeling belongs to a very rough-and-ready psychology, and critics of both kinds are liable to fall into error if they try to think of their own field as autonomous and self-contained. Behind a particular intellectual outlook there is always a particular set of prejudices—a habit of thinking in certain words and images each coloured with a particular feeling—and implied in every emotional attitude there is always some sort of philosophy, however crude and incoherent. Coleridge once suggested that a set of ideas will ultimately generate its own orthodoxy of sentiment and action if it is allowed to sink deeply enough into the mind, and this belief is so widely held that theologians often give all their attention to ideas and leave sentiments to take care of themselves. But the converse of Coleridge's proposition is also true: the emotional attitude will in the end generate its own appropriate set of ideas. Both processes are slow, and in very few of us are they ever completed. We remain in a state of disequilibrium, our sentiments at war with our ideas, and our deepest prejudices never brought to light. We call ourselves Christian, and our sentiments remain obstinately pagan; or we call ourselves pragmatists, but act under the influence of unconsciously Christian predispositions.

These tendencies find their clearest expression in poetry—not in the explicit meaning of a poem but in its more subtle suggestions. The undercurrents of speech, the taste and smell of words, the implications of a rhythm, the force and origin of an image, often tell us more about the poet and his readers than the superficial meaning does. Thus there is a very curious heterodoxy of feeling which underlies the apparent orthodoxy of Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, and runs directly counter to the superficial meaning. Nature is personified, or rather deified, and treated as being at once the agent and enemy of God: the Devil has disappeared, and the Christian feeling about the Devil has been transferred to Nature and modified in the process.

The popularity of Tennyson's work among people calling themselves Christians shows that his sentiments were widely held. Intellectual orthodoxy was accompanied by heterodoxy of sentiment. The underlying barely-conscious

predispositions of Tennyson's readers were not Christian; and this situation is neatly balanced by the position to-day. Among people who take poetry at all seriously, admiration for T. S. Eliot's poetry is widespread. Many of these readers do not call themselves Christians, and they often take some trouble to explain that they do not agree with Mr Eliot's *ideas*. They try to account for their odd position by saying that they like the music or the imagery of his poetry, or by saying that they prefer his earlier poetry, which they take to be non-Christian. They bolster up this defence by completely misunderstanding a poem like *The Hippopotamus*, and regarding it as an attack on the Church instead of a poetic statement of the Christian distinction between the Church Eternal and the visible Church on earth. The ideas *implied* by their attitude are more Christian than they realize, but to defend themselves against a reversion to the unpopular doctrine of Christianity they distort the explicit content of Mr Eliot's later poems into something plainly silly,[1] thus allowing themselves to reject it intellectually whilst accepting it emotionally.

Emotional orthodoxy would be quite as hard to define as intellectual orthodoxy, but one or two simple points can be made quite clear. No intellectual scheme is satisfactory if it fails to take into account all the known facts, or rests on arguments and observations which are demonstrably faulty. "Orthodoxy" in philosophy is more a matter of proportion and emphasis than of deliberate exclusion. In the same way, a proper development of the sentiments implies proportion and balance, but not crudity and insensibility. The doctrines of a religion (like the program of a political party) must always be capable of expression in a simplified form which meets the needs of believers whose knowledge and intellectual ability are small, and the sentiments of a particular attitude must be capable of a similar simplification. But if a real community of belief is to be maintained, it is important that the simple forms should not contradict those which are more comprehensive and more delicately adjusted; they should demand the best possible adjustment for each believer, and lead

[1] A case in point is the line "Teach us to sit still" in *Ash Wednesday*. I have heard a critic, himself a poet and deeply appreciative of Mr Eliot's poetry, maintain that this means "Teach us to stand by and do nothing to relieve suffering," whereas in its context it is quite plainly a plea for the inner tranquillity which is the necessary condition of Christian action.

on from one stage to another as one book of Euclid leads to another.

Sentimentality—the indulgence in emotion for emotion's sake—is immoral by any standard. It involves emotion which is inappropriate to its object—too great or too little, or of the wrong kind—and the sentimentalist is not prepared to act on his feeling, and therefore he is deluding himself about the beliefs that really govern his action. He may be a better or a worse man than he thinks he is, but his self-deception and unconscious hypocrisy is itself an evil; and sentimental poetry, whatever its pretensions may be, is morally bad for precisely the same reason.

There is, however, a great deal of moralizing poetry which is not sentimental but is, nevertheless, morally bad in a slightly different sense. It is never easy to write poetry that will express a particular attitude, for the writer is always tempted to lean too heavily on the excellence of his ideas, and in order to make them palatable (perhaps in order to make them palatable to himself), he tacks on to them the imagery and rhythm that belong to an attitude already popular. The result is often a coarsening of the attitude, such as one finds in many hymns which seem to support Christian beliefs and Christian morals, but make use of technical effects which correspond to a coarse sensibility or a truculent and unchristian frame of mind.

To the politician, concerned only with using the resources of rhetoric to drive people to a particular course of action, such poetry is acceptable, not because it is likely to persuade people who are of a different opinion, but because it may help to keep up the spirits of his own troops. The full-blooded partisan, who cares more for immediate effects than for ultimate objectives, will always prefer Marvell's *The Character of Holland* ("Holland, that scarce deserves the name of land") to his *Horatian Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland*. But the moralist cannot accept help which gains a temporary advantage but undermines the real qualities of character and sentiment on which a durable achievement must depend. Too often, good poets have blunted their instruments and done their cause an ill service when they have tried to write explicit moral or political exhortation. It is not merely a matter of failing to write poetry at all, as Wordsworth sometimes failed in the *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*, but of writing poetry which corresponds to a cruder sensibility than that from which the moral

impulse springs. The tones become more strident, the rhythms cruder, and the imagery and metaphor more commonplace.

Even Hopkins showed this loss of poetic quality when he tried to write direct political poetry—

> What shall I do for the land that bred me,
> Her homes and fields that folded and fed me?
> Be under her banner and live for her honour:
> Under her banner I'll fight for her honour.
>
> CHORUS: Under her banner live for her honour.

The repetitions add nothing, except in the sense in which a drunken chorus gains a kind of bullying weight by repetition. There is no clear imagery, nothing to give form and precision to the vague sentiment anybody might feel about the country he was born in; and the poem might almost as well have been written in Patagonia. Hopkins enclosed a note when he sent the poem to Robert Bridges: "This is not final of course. Perhaps the name of England is too exclusive." Certainly the landscape is vague, but the poem is not and could not be a poem for a Christian or a citizen of the world. When Hopkins wrote a poem about the excellence of life in God's world he tried to reveal the variety and harmony of created things through one particular scene; but here, for once, he was writing a poem which was universal only in the sense in which people can be mean and truculent anywhere. The rollicking metre expresses nothing more than a ready-made bullet-headed jingoism which is bad because it implies a coarsening of thought and feeling, a narrowing rather than an intensification of sympathy, and an encouragement of those elements in human nature which themselves produce discord, cruelty and short-sighted selfishness.

It is not a question of condemning martial rhythms outright, or even of condemning the militant response in a particular case. No doubt there are poems which are unnecessarily truculent—perhaps Milton's sonnet *On the late Massacher in Piemont* only just escapes the charge—for indignation at a crime is always quick to turn into just that sort of sectarian bitterness which produced the crime itself; but to say whether a particular response is morally right is a straightforward problem for the moralist. The kinds of rhythm which express anger or grief or lighthearted gaiety may all be used on the wrong occasion, but the

misuse of rhythm with which we are here concerned depends on those minor suspensions and variations which the prosodist overlooks. What is in question is the degree of subtlety in the use of the rhythm; the martial rhythm is not necessarily wrong (there is no loss of subtlety in Milton's sonnet), but in Hopkins's poem, as in a great deal of moral and political poetry, the rhythm is used about as delicately as a tom-tom. It is as if one said, with some misgiving, " I think he ought to be punished," and got the cheerful answer, " Righto, Guv'nor, I'll wring his bleeding neck for yer."

A coarse use of language and a violent appeal to stock responses are essential parts of this hearty banging of the big drum, whether it is the big drum of militancy or pity or any other emotion. The finer shades of meaning are lost, as they are lost in Southey, Longfellow and Macaulay; the sentiment may not be wrongly placed or wrongly proportioned, but the quality is at fault, and by relapsing into a crude way of feeling we set ourselves upon the road that leads back to self-righteousness, sentimentality and humbug. From the point of view of the poet and critic, as from the point of view of the moralist, the value of political or moral poetry is measured by the quality of thought and feeling expressed in the poem, not by the colour of the poet's shirt. It is not the business of the poet or the prophet to drive people to the polling-booth, but to do something to modify the sentimentality, hysteria and short-sightedness which poison the whole field of political relations.

For this reason, poets who put their talents at the service of a political party or a religious sect always become uneasy. They are torn between their own poetic and moral impulse and the tub-thumper's desire to persuade people quickly without bothering to influence them in any fundamental way. The good poet will always fight against the temptation to over-simplify the issues, to coarsen the sentiment and to deny the devil his due. If he lapses for a moment he will recant, and thus on a narrow view he is always a bad party man. It may, however, happen that there is a real difference between the poet and his party. A poet may turn to help a party or a sect because it seems to him that some of their aims are identical with his own, and yet he may differ profoundly from his fellow-partisans. What are ultimate aims with the party are only incidental with the poet; his conception of justice may lead him to support a particular

agitation, yet the ideas and prejudices on which his conception of justice rests may be very different from those of his fellow-agitators. His deepest beliefs and principles may indeed be less welcome to the agitators than to their opponents.

Something of this seems to be happening to-day to one or two poets like Stephen Spender, who see in the Communist Party the instrument most likely to achieve some measure of economic justice and stability but find very few people in that party who have any sympathy with the poet's passion for the development of thought, language and sensibility. Modern society does not put a very high value either on intelligence or on sensibility, but here and there people are beginning to feel that the general moral decline can only be arrested through a renaissance that will value these qualities, and therefore philosophy and poetry. To say that El Greco is not only a better artist, but also a more Christian artist than Watts, and that Shakespeare is a more Christian poet (in our sense) than Ella Wheeler Wilcox is an exaggerated way of speaking, but it may serve to make the contention clear. The purposes which poetry can serve in relation to theology and morality are these: it can render more vivid and more urgent the realities on which rational theology rests, it can put moral truths in a persuasive and effective form, and it can help to resist that narrowing of sympathy and coarsening of sentiment which is itself immoral. At times, it can serve to turn our desires from a direction in which their effects are harmful to one in which they are harmless or good. Whether we intend it to do so or not, literature is always exerting an influence, positive or negative, on us in these diverse ways. To discuss the moral influence of literature is part of the business of the literary critic, but the moralist himself cannot afford to ignore the quality of the literature which he reads or commends or tolerates.

MICHAEL ROBERTS.

The Problem of Luxury

THE origin of this article, and of another which will be a sequel to it, lies in a sense of personal unrest. For several years I have wondered whether there was any justification for my pipe or my glass of beer or my theatre ticket, for this new suit or that old mahogany table; and increasingly

there came on me the conviction that, if there were, I did not know it. I concluded that I was living irrationally, and that I was doing many things just because I wanted to do them, and without seeing their fitness or unfitness in a wider scheme. At last this *laissez-faire* became too uncomfortable; it was clear that I must try to think the whole matter out. These articles are the result, and this explanation of their origin may excuse and even justify their somewhat personal character. In the first I shall be concerned to see what luxury is and to show the complexity of the problem that it raises; in the second I shall approach the problem from a different angle and explain the conclusion to which so far I have been led. The conclusion will be something very different from a final and complete solution. I only know that in thinking about it I have been taken far out of my depth into realms not only of theology proper, but also of ethics and economics, metaphysics and politics, so that my humble sixpenny packet of Goldflake is now actually, though as yet to me indefinitely, related to the divine ordering of the world.

The Word and its Meanings

A certain Mr Wylie in 1887 wrote a little book called *Labour, Leisure and Luxury*, and in it I find the phrase "the manly, healthful and useful luxuries of the rich." On his title page he quotes this sentence from Ruskin: "Luxury is indeed possible in the future—innocent and exquisite luxury for all and by the help of all." And Mr Hartley Withers in *Poverty and Waste* (1914) defines luxury as "anything that we can do without, without impairing our health of mind and body," and quotes as "obvious examples" motor cars and telephones (p. 155). I quote these not only to illustrate, as this last sentence does, the relativity of the idea of luxury, but also for the example the first two sentences afford of a use of the word which seems to run counter to the general usage of our language.

For, if we turn to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, we find that all compounds of "lux-" contain the idea of excess, and that in Latin and the Romance languages the word connotes vicious indulgence. An inspection of our own knowledge of current English usage also suggests that, whatever be the detailed content of the idea, our normal ethical judgments involve some kind of condemnation.

If introspection shows this to be the case, an analysis of the idea of luxury at once becomes important. Certain points seem obvious: that luxury is a contingent idea, and has meaning only in relation to the world as we know it; and that it is also a social idea, for it is difficult to think of the existence of solipsistic luxury. And, finally, luxury is in some sense a judgment on another's behaviour, for it is difficult to suppose that a man would characterize his own consumption as luxurious. The main elements, then, in any situation involving the idea of luxury are: free agents, disposal commodities, and an attitude towards the consumption of those commodities (not excluding time) which involves for an observer the idea of excess.

I said just now that this began as a personal problem in my own life, and personal it always remains, for the art of consumption is almost synonymous with the art of living, and in the end the concrete situation we have to envisage is the bare question: " Is this right, and if not, what is?" As it appears to me, there are three main ways of attempting to discover an answer to this question. Either we may try to discover rational principles of which the concrete situation is a particular example; or, as Christians, we may accept the principles implicit in the records of Jesus' life and teaching and try to apply them in particular cases; or we may rely on some intuition to direct our action. Although I have for convenience stated these as three different things, I hasten to add that I do not mean thereby to contradict the common experience that our actual judgments of right and wrong are arrived at by a combination of all three. But because we have—or rather I had—a hope of discovering some principle which would, for example, justify my feeling that a glass of beer was right, I shall confine most of what I have to say to the first—*i.e.*, to the search for a principle.

In the earlier stages of my search I thought in my simplicity that the encyclopædias might help. But the *Encyclopædia Britannica* told me only what I knew before, that the conception of luxury " is essentially relative to both time and person," and that " there is no absolute measuring rod by means of which the ultimate social and ethical value of expenditure can be tested," and again that " economic progress and changing standards of life quickly alter contemporary notions of the types of expenditure that may be included under the category of luxuries." All this is

true, but unsatisfying. I hoped for a constant equation with three variables, so that knowing myself at any instant as S, the other person or persons concerned as O, and the disposable commodity as C, I could neatly write down that luxury exists when $^{k}SOC > M$, where M is something as basic and unchanging as π. Now I see that to hope for that is to hope for an answer to the question, "Who is my neighbour?" when the point at issue is, "Whose neighbour am I?" But I must not anticipate what belongs to a later stage in my search.

The *Encyclopædia of Philosophy and Psychology* is less indefinite. "A thing is a luxury if it involves a using up of accumulated power without permanent equivalent for the future. We must beware of defining luxury in terms of pleasure. The more real pleasure a thing gives the less likelihood is there that it can be described as a luxury; for the presumption is that it will tend to increase the productive power of those who enjoy it. A pleasure becomes a luxury (1) when it is harmful to the physical and moral constitution of those who enjoy it, and (2) when it involves a waste of capital or labour power beyond what the recipient of the pleasure is stimulated by it to replace." Here there is the form of my equation, but how am I to measure the replacement effect of the pleasure of a glass of beer?

Luxury in Relation to the Category of Need

It is clear that a first step is to consider further this idea of waste, for it is here that we make contact with the notion of excess brought out by the *O.E.D.* The calculus of excess can take two forms, according as its dominant category is either that of need or that of use: we shall have to consider both. We shall begin with *need.* For the writer, and probably for the readers of this article, the idea of need is derived from external sources. In terms of what we conceive as necessities most of us have few, if any, wants; yet around us we see others whose need for the barest necessities is pitifully obvious. In face of that situation can we evaluate our own need?

The problem is an old one. In one form a solution was attempted in 1336 when courses at meals were restricted to two, and three on feast days. In 1363 there were laws against excessive apparel, and in 1463 these were made more detailed. But sumptuary legislation in England

ended with the Tudors, though in Scotland it continued at least to 1681. In any case the arbitrary imposition from without of some standard of personal need is not an ethical solution; nor is the matter as simple as such legislation might be taken to imply. This point is made in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*:

> Some of the most powerful economic motives are to be found in the desire of men to realize an idea or a scheme of life which seems to them an improvement of their present one. Once their mere bodily wants are satisfied their further desires may be called luxuries. This, however, is not strictly accurate. In a great number of occupations the worker who is able to satisfy the former wants only would not be efficient. Therefore, one must extend the meaning of the term " necessaries " to include in it all those things which are required for efficiency. What is consumed beyond that point may well be described as consisting of luxuries. . . . In the case of individual expenditure, luxury can only arise when there is a surplus beyond physical needs. If that expenditure is so directed as to cut into the margin required for efficiency, then inroads are being made into future income-earning power. But after full provision has been made for efficiency there is yet another claim on the surplus—namely, that for the accumulation of capital. . . . The central point is the fixing of the expenditure which is required for full efficiency. . . . If progress is conceived in a wide sense the highest culture becomes an element in national efficiency. (But) there is a danger that consumption which was begun as conducive to efficiency may be continued much beyond that point.

In the last part of this long quotation we see the close relation between need and use; but for the present we keep to the problem of need. In its simplest terms the situation may be stated thus: (1) I have at my disposal some property. This way of phrasing the fact keeps the question to the actual situation, and does not raise the further point of the wisdom of private property.[1] (2) There is need somewhere. For the Christian it is safe to be as dogmatic as this, for the only community he can consider is the whole human race. So the problem is always with us, but when need marches close at hand it becomes more insistent. (3) If I have a surplus, it is my duty to help others in need, whoever they may be. I need not argue this: the problem is, of course, how to evaluate my need, so as to discover what is surplus,

[1] On this see G. F. Barbour, *A Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics* pp. 130 *ff.*

and theirs. In other words, in evaluating the rightness of possible ways of disposing of a surplus, there are at least four variables in the equation—my need and X's need, and my world and X's world; and my world and X's world differ in that mine includes and X's excludes X, and *vice versa*.

Already we see the complexity of any determination such as this, and when we go on to enquire further into the meaning of need the different views of economists increase our perplexity. Let me illustrate this by one or two quotations.

Fr C. S. Devas, a Roman Catholic economist, discusses, in his *Political Economy*, the conventional distinction between necessaries and superfluities, and I give a summary of his exposition. Absolute necessaries consist of all that is needed according to work, constitution and surroundings to keep men in good health and efficient. Conventional necessaries are the goods proper to a man's station in life. Here Devas adds that " it would be reprehensible for anyone to give away so much of his property that from the residue he could not live decently according to his own station in life and the work that has fallen to him "; and he records a decision of the Westminster County Court on November 13, 1896, that wine was a necessity for a young man of noble family. He divides superfluities into ornaments and elegancies on the one hand, and luxuries on the other. In the former class he puts goods serving towards intellectual or æsthetic training, and adds that " festivity, state occasions, and worship justify a certain elaborate magnificence." In the latter class he puts consumption which (1) ministers to physical excess or brings suffering to others, (2) involves a disproportion between the sum spent and either the income of the spender or the result achieved by the expenditure.

Marshall in his *Principles of Economics* has some pages relevant to our purpose. He asks whether necessaries are things necessary for life or those which are necessary for efficiency, and argues that " some consumption of alcohol and tobacco and some indulgence in fashionable dress are in many places so habitual that they may be said to be conventionally necessary, since in order to attain them the average man and woman will sacrifice some things which are necessary to efficiency." In a suggestive note he remarks that, " If a Newton or a Watt could have added a hundredth part to his efficiency by doubling his personal expenditure, the increase in his consumption would have been truly productive."

Davidson in an article in the *International Journal of Ethics* (vol. ix) makes some good points, and I shall have occasion to quote him again. He maintains that " no absolute scale of necessaries, comforts and luxuries can be drawn up," and that

in regard to conventional necessaries " many, by a debased public opinion, are forced to live beyond their means."

Lastly, St Thomas Aquinas' references to necessaries are to the point here. " A thing is said to be necessary if a man cannot without it live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or those of whom he has charge. The necessary considered thus is not an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position." " Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own in order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be insufficient for one to live on in keeping with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life; for no man ought to live unbecomingly."

The length of these quotations will have been justified if by them two points become clear. One is that we may not blindly disregard the fact of social stratification as integral to any metaphysic of economic ethics. The other is the extreme complexity of the concept of need, a complexity brought out by Troeltsch in *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, and shown to involve more directly than that of use the problem of the divine ordering of the world.

Luxury in Relation to the Category of Use

But for other reasons than that of complexity we may shift our ground from *need* to *use*. The twin ideas of excess and need savour of legalism, and the good man " will try to do not only what is allowable because it is not wrong, but what is consonant with his ideal and therefore right." Davidson (loc. cit.) says that " luxury consists in using up the results of our labours in unworthy or irrational ways, and luxury is therefore unfortunately as much within the reach of the poor as of the rich."

If we found the concept of need complex, we shall find the concept of use so far-reaching as almost to defy systematic treatment. Any discussion of it clearly involves an attempt at the evaluation of the relative ethical rightness of the different ends pursued, or which might have been pursued. To quote Davidson again: " Before an expenditure is fully justified we must answer two questions to ourselves and to society: Is the end aimed at worthy ? and is it obtained at the cost of a disproportionate amount of sacrifice ?" And,

after mentioning the Roman who " entertained his friends with a dish of the tongues of birds which had been taught to speak," he argues that " the first tea drinkers and the first tobacco smokers have perhaps proved themselves benefactors of their species, because they braved the ignorant condemnation of their own generation."

Here again, as with Mr Hartley Withers's telephones and motor cars, we see the relativity of use, which makes a general approach to the problem alone possible. The kind of questions we have to ask are: What is the place of culture? How far is poverty a school of culture and character? How far does well-being diminish concentrated effort? What kind of private satisfaction is ultimately a public good? If we find we work badly in uncongenial surroundings, should we first change ourselves or the surroundings? and (to revert to a combination of need and use) have we any means of judging whether another's real need may not be that he should continue to endure his present distress?

I now proceed to a brief discussion of the principles which should be before our minds when, in looking for an answer to these questions, we attempt to assess the rightness of any consumption.

The first in order of importance is the distinction between the short and the long view. Our natural sympathy with suffering immediately before us, or it may be the discomfort it arouses in us, makes it easy for impetuosity to take the upper hand. Are those of us, for instance, whose work lies in a university, justified in living as expensively as we do? Ought our colleges, instead of supplying us with dinners in hall of the kind that are customary, to supply simpler meals, and to give the money so saved to the furtherance of " education, religion, learning and research "? The present writer hopes that he is not merely excusing an indulgence, which he unashamedly enjoys, if he points out that a dinner in hall is a small *part* of what makes a university able to give to the world its distinctive contribution; and, if this is true, it follows that the maintenance of standards here may be a factor in making permanent that outlook towards social well-being which will not endure slums. The argument cuts both ways, and is difficult to use; but it holds over a wide range. To an outsider, much of an artist's expenditure may seem superfluous, yet in the long run it may create a suitable milieu for greatness, and all that that may ultimately imply in terms of social well-being. But while we may rightly

uphold the wisdom of a long view, we must be ready with an answer to the question: So long as things like slums exist, ought we not to have a war-time mentality about our spending?

Next in order of importance is the necessity for recognizing the different conditions which favour the production of æsthetic, moral and intellectual values. What these conditions are is matter of fact, and experience seems sufficiently consistent to make some generalization valid. Moral values are usually fostered by austerity and stunted by prosperity. The intellectual values have not quite the same characteristic. They can endure, and sometimes seem to need, more prosperity than the moral for their adequate actualization. The æsthetic values—the appreciation and production of beauty—certainly move still further away from austerity of life. This seems to be fact, and in determining our consumption we have to reckon with it in deciding what we ought to produce by that consumption. Sidgwick is interesting here: "I find that the study of history leads me to contemplate with sympathy and satisfaction the opulence and luxury of the few amid the hard lives of the many, because it presents itself as the practically necessary soil in which beauty and the love of beauty grow and develop, and because I see how, when new sources of high and refined delight have been thus produced, the best and most essential of its benefits extend from the few to the many and become abiding possessions of the race" (*I.J.E.* xvi).

Third, we need to remember what Troeltsch brings out, that there are two conceptions of charity. It may in its purity be a way of helping others; or it may be nothing other than the practice of ascetic self-denial. This latter is really selfishness, for it rests on some such belief as "I need this kind of medicine to get well," and then asceticism itself becomes a luxury.

Fourth, and lastly, it is important that a realistic treatment of any situation should be adopted, and the dangers of over-scrupulosity avoided so far as may be. Nothing, it is true, can abrogate the Christian's obligation to think in terms of the whole human race; but, in terms of practical possibility, action only tends towards that as an ideal limit. Practical impossibility may sometimes cancel theoretical obligation, and we succeed in making only still more complex an already over complicated issue if we shut our

eyes to the brute facts of the real world, hoping to live in an ideal one where " ought " really will imply " can."

In addition to these four principles, which ought to be before our minds when we try to answer the kind of questions that I enumerated above, there are other more miscellaneous considerations which should help to order our thinking, and which are suggested by Marshall's dictum that " it is easier to work well than to use wealth well, and much easier than to use leisure well."

In the matter of right consumption there is, to adopt a phrase of James Ward's, no knife-edge but a saddle-back. This is, of course, true of individual consumption, but the thickness of the saddle is more apparent when the consumption is that of the natural unit of a family where a diversity of interests and claims, sometimes conflicting, have to be brought into a harmony. Theoretically considered, we can see that there will be a lower limit of consumption below which subsistence will be impossible, and an upper limit above which consumption is clearly wrong. Between these two there is a wide range, and the place of the family in the social stratification is one of the factors which determine successive approximations to the ideally right.

It is obvious in fact that the motives behind consumption must be related to something wider than the consumption itself. " All economists are agreed," says Davidson, " that the mere spending of wealth is not a service to the community," and Mr Richmond in his *Christian Economics* argues as an economist that luxury is not good for trade. " The plea that luxury makes money circulate does not absolve anyone from his duty to spend on rational wants only, a duty which lies on all of us, whether our means be great or small " (Davidson). And although we have met it indirectly before in various ways, it is here that there comes in for the first time directly the connexion between an individual's consumption and his view of his relation to the community. Here, too, the priority of the category of use to that of need is clear.

Towards Another Approach

At this point, I feel more out of my depth than ever. The problem of the one and the many does indeed come to a head in the most trivial acts of consumption, and more and

more is it clear that there is no cut-and-dried solution of it. The rich man, even though his riches be one surplus penny, has a difficult job, and a completely easy conscience is not to be had. This may be unfortunate, but it is not surprising, because when we have done all that we ought to have done we are still unprofitable servants, and only in terms of a legalistic system is there righteousness of a self-satisfied kind. I referred to this point before when I spoke of the hope that foolishly enough was in me when I began to examine the problem. Now it is becoming more clear that the only test of the rightness of any particular consumption is to be found in its approximation to the standard set by certain principles as realized in a developing context.

I have already very briefly discussed certain major principles, the importance of which does not always seem to be recognized in this connexion. It is now time to mention, though without discussion, some which are more obviously applicable to our problem. In this matter of consumption the idea of trusteeship is certainly involved. I have said that luxury is a social idea, and it seems also to be true that there can be no proper predication of luxury when the consumer has no consciousness of social obligation. Again, if mere spending is of no social worth, as we argued just now, it follows that work is a duty, for leisure is the spending of time regarded as a commodity, and it is as true of time as it is of anything else that private property is "an institution which ought to be and must be subordinated to social ends." The general notion of property is a right of control over things which society recognizes; but it is important to distinguish between property for use and property for power, though even when this distinction is carefully made judgment in particular cases is very difficult in the complexity of modern society.

Complexity evidently pervades the whole matter. We saw the vanity of attempting any calculus of need. A calculus of use is formally not much less difficult; but if we begin more simply, and are in earnest with the idea of trusteeship, and with the importance of neighbourliness, we may find that the question, How does my manner of life affect my neighbour? will solve a good many practical perplexities which remain unsolved if our search is mainly for the less personal principle of use. That at all events will be my manner of approach in the sequel.

H. C. L. Heywood.

The Worship of God and the Life of the People

Worship is a primary function of the Church. Sincerely expressed and truly directed, it is both its duty and its source of power. The recreative power of worship lies partly in the contemplation of perfection which is of its essence, partly in its corporateness where that is genuine, and chiefly in the fact of God's entering into the life of the worshipper. For worship is not only something men do to God, it is the coming of God to them. It refreshes not merely because in it a man escapes for a few moments from himself, but because when self goes out the Spirit of God enters in. If self-centredly men worship in order to gain the best seats in the next world or in this, if all their prayers are begging letters, or if the emphasis is on edification, it does not happen. But when, even for a moment, they lose themselves in reaching out and up to God, He enters into their lives to restore and heal. There is impressive testimony to the fact of this joyful experience from many generations of worshippers.

Sacrifice is the point in human life where God breaks in—with power. In sacrificial worship which is directed to God present in and working through Jesus, the risen Lord, and in which the worshipper for a while is lost in praise and adoration, the barriers fall away, the channels are cleared and the Spirit of God pours into the souls of men. It is not accidental that the standard and climax of Christian worship is a Sacrament of which the very form emphasizes the fact of the divine initiative. Assuming, as a Christian must, that the life of God in the souls of men is in itself a joyful experience and also bears valuable fruits in social life, it is much to be wished that the men of this age should have the vision of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ which gave power to the Church of the Apostles and sent the mediæval Church to its knees !

But it must be confessed that that vision and experience are hard to come by, and, apparently, to the great majority of English people to-day they are unknown. The vision of God does not grip with the conviction and strength with which the men of the Bible were held by their experience—

> " Whom have I in heaven but thee ? and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of thee."

For many, God and the things of God are like the scent of a peat fire that greets a motorist from the city as he passes along a moorland road. He likes it because it speaks to a part of him overlaid by city life, and he may value it just because it is rare and remote. A religion that is a passing fragrance, like the delicious irrelevance of the scent of moorland peat in the life of a busy city man, may be genuine as far as it goes; but it does not go far. The irrelevant is also the powerless; and under the pressure of modern life, especially in middle age, a habit of worship that has no potency is crowded out.

It is not merely another way of saying the same thing to compare, as F. R. Barry does in his best book, inadequate religion to the place and function of mediæval walls in a city, which has pushed its boundaries far beyond them. Citizens may value them for their picturesqueness, archæologists for their history; they may still influence the plan of the centre of the city to some small extent, but they no longer serve their ancient purpose or any other. Similarly, for many people, God and His worship are an emotional throw-back to the days of childhood when religion occupied a considerable place in their daily time-table. Their religion has remained in a state of arrested development while the rest of their personality has continued to grow. It is a survival, quaint with an old-world charm, but not a controlling, determining element in their life; and often they love to have it so. A childish practice of worship in a grown man does not communicate power and, almost certainly, it falls into desuetude.

Equally liable to be driven out by the pressure of things and the pleasantness of things is the worship of men—there are many such in the business world—who are naturally religious, but have no substance to their belief. They may believe vaguely in "One who is above," and in putting service before self; on occasions they may do obeisance to "the Master-Architect," but of the character and purpose of His design and of His way of carrying it out they have no clear notions. Where there is no content of belief, and nothing to compel love, worship languishes.

Thus for a wide range of people within our churches and on the fringes of them there is not a vision and experience of God which makes worship for them a supreme value in life. Beyond them, especially in the congested areas of our country, there is a multitude who never, except perhaps

in moments of emotional stress, give God and the ultimate values a thought, while there are a few who repudiate the idea of God because it is associated with things and practices which they abhor.

What are the causes of this decline in the habit of worship, and of the apparent difficulty of modern man to say *con amore* the great worshipful words of Scripture? The reasons are many, but there are some which operate more powerfully than others in industrial England, and are more fundamental than clerical voices and Sunday golf.

1. Economic pressures and the tyranny of the machine as they are to-day do not predispose men to the faith of Jesus in a living and loving God. In a one-roomed house under the shadow of a colliery that has been closed, in places where insecurity or absence of livelihood makes men too anxious concerning daily bread or where a wide choice of available pleasures dulls their sense of eternity, it is difficult to see the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ so clearly as to be compelled to worship. When men become aware in the community of the prevalence of exploitation, inequality of opportunity, class distinctions, unbridled individualism, social life does not naturally find expression in the public worship of Jesus Christ, especially when the Church seems to be identified with influences which have produced and are maintaining these evil things.

If a man is driven by economic necessity to serve mammon for nine-tenths of the time—and often at the expense of his neighbour—he will make a poor hand at Christian worship. The Church does not pay enough heed to our Lord's warning against the corroding influence of money. The economic system in which we are all caught produces a scale of values very unlike His, and often makes men worshippers of mammon, be they rich or poor, whether they dabble in the Stock Exchange during the week or paddle in football pools at the week-end. A man and a society cannot worship God and mammon.

The change in modern industry from intelligent tradesmanship to machine-tending, and from *manu*facture to mass production, weakens the creative faculties of men, which are so near the divine, and as yet it has not been balanced by the good use of leisure.

The relentless uniform beat of a machine is not the natural rhythm of man's life. Tie a man to a machine—and it is a noisy one in a coal mine—submit him to excessive

speeding-up of work and life, make him travel long distances in overcrowded trains and buses to and from work, drive young people through competitive pressures to evening and continuation classes *after* the day's work, then by the time Sunday comes they are too exhausted to worship. If the Lord's Day Observance Society would go all out for a five-day working week, it would do more to recover the use of Sunday for worship and spiritual recreation than it does at present by confusing Judaism with Christianity.

Every parish priest who is intelligently aware of the forces at work in society must be critical of a social and economic order which is making Christian worship and life more difficult than God intends them to be.

The difficulty is further increased because other social pressures and modern transport are breaking up the unity of the village as of the town. In the old days the English village worked, played, drank, and prayed together; nowadays the contour of many ecclesiastical parishes is the only relic of those times. The Church is attempting too difficult a task in trying to make worshipping congregations out of people who never do anything else together. Public worship ought to be the expression and indeed climax of a particular community's life, but the ecclesiastical parish is rarely a community. I agree, therefore, with the Master of the Temple, who writes in his recently published *Recollections* that for this and other reasons the time has come when the Church must reconsider its unit of work and worship.[1]

2. "When Christian worship was most spontaneous and natural," once wrote A. L. Lilley, "it was so largely because it believed itself to be assured of its object."

Nothing is more significant in the religious art of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries than the common symbolism found in the windows, doorways and capitals of churches so far apart as Arles, Toulouse, Moissac and Chartres. It is evidence not so much of travelling trades-

---

[1] "But now the village is less and less *autarkes*, an independent, self-sufficing unit. . . . The Church will, I believe, have to learn to think in terms of (let us say) the Rural Deanery, or the feeding area of the Central School instead of concentrating its attention on the village, and its necessarily very primitive apparatus. . . . Patronage is, it will be said, the greatest obstacle in the way. If it is an obstacle the Church must boldly say to the mountain, 'Be thou removed and cast into the sea,' and it will be done" (*Looking Forward*, by Harold Anson, pp. 23-4, also chapter 36).

men as of a unity of belief and a well-understood uniformity of exegesis and interpretation.

The Roman Church still holds, with some subtlety, to the system of belief of which its liturgy is a translation into the language of worship. Some cultured and devout members of the Church of England, and some uneducated ones, as a result of intensive pastoral work and instruction, may be able to think without discomfort in the terms of the fourth, thirteenth or sixteenth century, and to use in worship without sense of constraint the language and symbolism which fitted those ways of thinking. But the majority of people to-day cannot. Their instinct for worship does not become a vital thing because they are not " assured of the nature of its object," and because in public worship they are asked to use concepts and words that are, so to say, in a foreign tongue.

There is no short cut to a revival of worship by ignoring the changes in belief since the sixteenth century. The old cosmology has gone for good. A liturgical use of Scripture which is based on fundamentalism, or one which requires a mental gymnastic that seems to the modern man curious and unhealthy, cannot be for him a vehicle of living and sincere worship.

What is possible behind the walls of monasteries is not possible for those who live in crowded thoroughfares. The timely writings of those who have been influenced by the Liturgical Movement on the Continent are weakened by their inability to appreciate this. The man who is living fully in the contemporary world finds it difficult to persuade himself that when he sings " Blessed shall he be that taketh thy children: and throweth them against the stones," he means more or less the opposite. Neither does he desire to persuade himself to use language in that way when he is addressing God or anyone else.

The fashioning of a symbolism and language of worship more congruous with living contemporary belief is a task which the Church of England cannot avoid. It is committed to the use of the vulgar tongue in its worship, and that surely implies that the language of worship shall reflect the contemporary[1] thought of the Church. The task is urgent—it presses upon those whose theology is fundamentally orthodox

[1] By " contemporary " I do not mean the changing fashions of the day or even of a decade, but the abiding forms of the century or age.

as much as upon the unorthodox, for until the instrument of worship is reformed, the effort to re-evangelize England cannot be brought to fruition.

The plain man's difficulty in worshipping is increased by the narrow pietism of some who are set apart to help him. Partly in consequence of influences to which I have referred, they give him the impression that the God whom they worship is the God of religion only. The more earnest such men are the more they try to make good the loss in extensiveness by increased intensity.

Nevertheless, a pietism that looks for the Lord only in His temple and thinks that He is only interested in what goes on there is not the Christian worship of the Triune God. The God of Christ's revealing cares for the whole life of man. He meets a man not only in the vertical relationship of the soul and God, but also in and through the horizontal relationships of life.

The whole of existence is touched by God as well as the specifically moral and religious life. "He has given us all things richly to enjoy," said St Paul, and that rich enjoyment is the stuff of which Christian acts of worship are made. I am persuaded that many men to-day need, first of all, not to be urged to pray more intensely, but to be helped, as Professor Farmer has said, "to identify God." Both Evangelicalism and Anglo-Catholicism, indeed all the "isms," should lay to heart von Hügel's words,

> "There is one God and innumerable variety of sides of life, every one of which in so far as it is true and good springs from Him and requires Him."

If this sketchy diagnosis of a contemporary situation is at all near the truth, then there is a great task for the specialists in theology and liturgy working in co-operation, and in touch with the general practitioner. In this connexion the general practitioner should be not only the parish priest, but also, and indeed particularly, the thoughtful layman. There is often in the latter's approach to these things a homely realism, a good earthiness and in consequence a sense of proportion and a touch of imagination which escape the academic student and the clerical mind. The Church has sufferred loss because the lay contribution to its thought ever since the New Testament was written has been by comparison small in quantity. One wishes, there-

fore, that both in the group-thinking and in the writing which require to be done in the years ahead lay men and women will take a large share.

A revival of the worshipful temper in men and women and of a sincerely expressed and truly directed worship in our churches should be the chief concern of churchmen. Its full fruition must wait on changes in society which the Church cannot directly bring about, but it would be brought forth thirty-fold, if not sixty-fold, if the Church, trusting in the present ministry of the Holy Spirit, were to try more courageously to adapt its organization to the pattern of contemporary life and to make its worship more relevant to that life as well as to the belief that nothing in the mystery of the Godhead contradicts the love and the holiness of the Cross of Christ.

For the rest, public worship, however well and truly ordered, will only be worthy of God and a source of power in society if the worshipper in his private life is loyal in aspiration and in act to the God of Christ's revealing, whose holiness is the purity of perfect love.

Leslie S. Hunter.

Some Difficulties in the Teaching of Religion in Secondary Schools

At a recent conference, in a discussion of the Report of the Social and Industrial Commission on Church and Youth, one speaker made the statement (apparently unchallenged) that "a boy or girl who entered our secondary schools to-day was lost to all religious and social work." It would be an easy matter to bring forward a wealth of evidence refuting this outrageous accusation, but it is quoted here simply as being typical of the condemnatory attitude of the many who lay at the door of the secondary school teachers most of the faults of the young people of to-day. The aim of this article is to point out some of the stumbling-blocks with which the path is now strewn, and which did not exist about twenty years ago, to mar the progress of those who now criticize the young so harshly; and to suggest methods of co-operation as a substitute for condemnation.

Subversive Influences on Day School Pupils

As secondary school pupils are submitted daily to education from two sources—(*a*) the school, and (*b*) the social background in their home—there is a double burden laid upon the teacher. He must not only attempt to train the body, mind and spirit of his pupils by means of what is done in school, but he must also seek to counteract in many of them the influence of what is daily being learnt out of school by visits to the pictures two or three times a week, and by living among adults who often expect of their children a different standard of conduct from their own. The teacher must, moreover, try to do this without undermining the loyalty of the child towards the parents.

Among the effects of excessive attendance at films is a greatly increased difficulty in securing real attention. The rapidity of the film, together with that of the car, brings the habit of only seeing vaguely, and continuous sounds from the wireless, only partly heeded, create the inability to take in even half of what is said. Moreover, the lack of reading and conversation in many homes is bringing a great narrowing of vocabulary, and one is frequently staggered to find how little that one says either in the Scripture or any other lesson is comprehended fully, even if the simplest language is used.

But the most pernicious effect of picture-going, to my mind, lies in its engendering of passivity, its stifling of initiative in the use of leisure; and one of the most cheering signs of the times is the reaction during the summer months in favour of hiking. Youth Hostels are supplying a great need in our social life, and we want many more of them and greater publicity for the existing ones. For the visit to the cinema is often not altogether for the sake of the picture, but just for somewhere to be, outside the rabbit-hutch-like quarters which many have to call home; housing conditions lie at the root of much of the nervous instability of the young, and are responsible for many misdemeanours, though the connexion is not always quite obvious.

Modern Housing Conditions and Absentee Parents

For a considerable proportion of the population, solitude is so rare as to have become a rather alarming experience. The limited living accommodation in modern expensive flats, as in the over-populated districts, has led to a corre-

sponding curtailment of much that used to contribute to the harmonious development of family and individual life. Boys and girls have nowhere for the delightful occupation of " messing about " which often led up to an interest which grew into a life work; father has nowhere for odd jobs and hobbies where he can let off steam with a hammer and nails. In some of the new blocks of flats provided by city councils, even window-boxes are not allowed, and one mother told a teacher that all that had been said during a visit to talk over certain plans for the children would be public property that evening, as the walls were so thin that every word said in one " home " could be heard next door. Life lived in these circumstances is bound to make for restlessness and a slackening of family ties. Moreover, the proportion of income which nowadays has to go to paying relatively high rents often makes it necessary for the mother as well as the father to go to work. That in itself brings greater risks in growing up than in the days when children were never left to their own devices. The absence of the mother is not, of course, always involuntary, especially in those middle-class homes where bridge parties are frequent, and as it is often combined with a servantless state of affairs many ten-year-olds nowadays have their own latch keys. There is a pernicious theory among some parents that they must be " modern " in not putting themselves out at all for their children's welfare, and that they will be laughed at if they do not accept invitations because that would involve leaving children alone. This hardening process began, I think, with certain rigid theories about the training of infants, according to which a mother must leave a baby to cry all night rather than interrupt an established routine. I believe that the most enlightened training colleges are now abandoning this Spartan enactment, and that some psychologists attribute various troubles in childhood, and the seeming absence of affection in some children, to the lack of adequate comforting in the troubles of infancy. Whatever the origin of this leaving of children without adult care, often for hours at a time, it remains one of the problems of the schools that the presence of children who can roam the streets and get up to all kinds of mischief is most unsettling, especially in forms where the children are not very intelligent and are likely to seek their pleasures as far from books as possible. The children of the more careful parents resent their own restrictions on seeing the freedom of their comrades.

Divergence of Moral Standards in Adults

It would be hard to say which was worse for the children: the house from which the parents are constantly absent, or the one in which they are present but in frequent conflict. Dr Kimmins's book, *The Child in the Changing Home*, written several years ago, and the more recent *Nothing is Safe*, by E. M. Delafield, give grim but true pictures of the unhappy children of parents who are at variance, and who do not, as in days gone by, conceal the fact from their offspring. And it is not only the children of the divorced parents who suffer; their classmates are affected too in their outlook on human relationships.

The diversity of standards on major moral issues has lowered considerably the age at which children believe that their own grown-ups are infallible, and any discussion which turns upon morals reveals a certain bewilderment in the young, in that grown-ups can differ on anything that matters so much as, for instance, whether killing is ever justifiable. Young people want everything to be absolutely right or wrong, true or false, and if even the Archbishop of Canterbury and Canon Dick Sheppard differ on such a vital matter as pacifism, who is to say what is right and what is wrong in that and other things too?

In more personal matters of conduct, standards also vary: some mothers, the children know, play bridge for money, some disapprove; there are cocktail parties at which it is considered amusing to find oneself a bit giddy, to which others object. Some parents think it is a joke to evade customs duties, others are quite willing to write a false excuse for absence, yet are shocked if their children do not tell them the truth or if they cheat in examinations.

Lack of Religious Background

If the children come to us in the schools day by day from homes where such confusing standards exist as regards morals, it is to be expected that they are no better off in their religious background. In fact, they have considerably less help there, for whereas the parents who try to live according to the Christian moral code are more numerous than those who do not, by far the greater number of parents have given up adherence to any form of organized religion. Many have said to me when entering their children as pupils: "I have lost touch and know that I have missed

something. Please give her what religion you can," or some such words. I have met but one parent who asked that no more than was obligatory should be given in matters of religion, though some have become anxious if a child asked to go to a place of worship, and thought that she must be getting ill.

Religion in School: Training in (*a*) Bible Study—Shortage of Specialists

As Sir Walter Moberly so truly said at the conference of the Institute of Christian Education last Easter, most parents in England still want the Christian religion taught in our schools, yet in appointing staff no head master or head mistress of a grant-aided school may inquire as to the faith of the candidates. I believe that the legal expression is that " no religious test " may be applied. There are certain turns which may be given to the conversation during an interview which as a rule lead the candidate to divulge voluntarily his or her standpoint in these matters, but it would seem fairer if those who blame the schools for their failure to teach enough religion would apply some of their energies to getting the wording of the law changed to " no denominational test." Even then, it would be difficult to get an adequate supply of teachers of religion for the schools. The problem is greater in boys' schools than in girls' schools (since posts in the Churches absorb the real specialists in religion among the men), but in both there is urgent need for more trained Scripture teachers.

The existence of the Institute of Christian Education will do much to help those teachers who are trying to make themselves efficient, and any who doubt the goodwill of the profession in tackling their most important task would be enlightened by making a tour in the summer holidays of the Vacation Courses. These are the Vacation Term of Biblical Study, the Board of Education Course, and courses at St Christopher's College, Blackheath, and at Glastonbury. There are others which take place less regularly, and they are all well attended.

(*b*) Training in Social Work

Although theologians may as yet be lacking on our staffs, in another direction most members of them are helping to build the city of God, for it must be unusual for a pupil

to leave a secondary school without having become conscious that he must do what he can for his neighbour, by his personal service as well as by his money, and this is the outcome of the staff's readiness to put in extra time to organize means of raising the funds for the school's social enterprises, and to help the children to make those personal contacts with the needy, which are so much more valuable than subscriptions.

(*c*) Training in Worship and Prayer

But though there may be hope that soon we shall be less blankly ignorant about the Bible, and though we are already in most schools paying due attention to our duty towards our neighbour, until it is realized that a chapel in these turbulent days is as necessary as a gymnasium we shall continue to be handicapped in the main business of religion. With the lack of privacy and quietude at home, and the complete unfamiliarity of most children with any place of worship, a chapel is required for the training in prayer and worship which alone will make of religion a personal relationship and not just one more theory about life. A sixth form girl once complained to me bitterly that her Scripture lessons " were just another lot of history lessons," and there will always be danger that the teaching is merely academic if we give all our time to dealing with the literature of religion and neglect the experimental side. We do not teach children to climb ropes in the classroom, but with the ropes themselves at hand in the gymnasium; we do not give them the theory of voice production and then suggest that they should sing when they are next alone; yet because of the difficulties of the place, in most schools it is probably true to say that, apart from daily school prayers in the hall, there is no following up by corporate praying of lessons in the technique of prayer, and this for lack of a suitable spot for the purpose.

For those who write down in answer to a questionary (to secure numbers, not names of churchgoers) that they attend church " when there is a funeral or a wedding," there is need to inculcate the idea that a definite place, as well as a definite time, is a help in learning to approach God, and still more that the God whom they are approaching is " the high and holy One that inhabiteth eternity," and for whose worship a special sanctuary is set apart.

Causes for Absence of Spirit of Worship

Science has placed at our disposal mechanical ways of overriding time and space, and of increasing our range of action. In 1914 the French philosopher Bergson said in an address on the Meaning of War: "Each new machine being for man a new organ—an artificial organ which merely prolongs the natural organs—his body became suddenly and prodigiously increased in size, without his soul being able at the same time to dilate to the proportions of his new body. . . . What would happen if the mechanical forces, which science had brought to a state of readiness for the service of man, should themselves take possession of man in order to make his nature material as their own?" The deep truth of this is more than obvious to-day. The uneducated and the half-educated are flattered by their extended powers and have the feeling of being "lords of creation" in a new sense. At all costs this cheap pride needs replacing by reverence, if spiritual values are to live on in this country at all. Secular education can indeed do something towards that (especially by the teaching of science itself), but not by any means all that needs to be done. The sense of wonder, that great gift shared by children and poets and artists, is in danger of being killed at an increasingly tender age in children by the crowding of every kind of toy, pleasure and experience into their lives by adults before they have reached the age to appreciate them. A blasé indifference is one of the more recent dragons which the educator has to tackle, and more than ever before we need to keep alive that sense of reverence for the Unseen that is natural in the child until it is killed by the materialism which surrounds him. A place which can be kept really beautiful, apart from the rough and tumble of the day's doings, would give more chance than the school hall for the spirit of worship to grow.

Progress of Younger Generation: (*a*) Absence of Sectarian Spirit

It is felt by some who are most anxious to forward the work of religion in schools that the interdenominational character of the grant-aided schools is a stumbling-block, and that the teaching given cannot be definite enough to be of practical use; but where members of the various denominations have collaborated in the making of a syllabus it is

quite obvious that sectarian feeling need not be roused, even by a most definite treatment of the fundamental Christian doctrines. For instance, I have always found it possible to be perfectly honest in teaching that a large section of the Christian Church holds that the Sacraments are the channels of grace for us ordained by our Lord, and that my own experience has taught me to accept the authority of the Church in that as in other matters, but that other Christian bodies, such as the Society of Friends, have other ways of approach, and that one has only to look at the devoted service of many in that body to realize that they have often more of the Spirit of Christ than some who would chain Him to His own ordinances. I am convinced that we must be definite to be of any use, but we need not therefore be intolerant. Denominationalism may be a bogey to be feared in provincial towns, but in the last few years in London I have found that most girls simply cannot believe that there could be any trouble about it. The issue now to be joined is between religion and paganism, not between one denomination and another, and they are clear-sighted enough to see that fact.

(*b*) Decrease of Materialism

The most hopeful feature of the whole situation is that the efforts we make to provide more opportunities for growth in religious life than can be given in school hours are so much appreciated by those who respond, that it is evident that the young folk of to-day are ready to turn away from "mean hopes and cheap pleasures," and that they are looking for a world order in which belief in spiritual values shall overcome the materialism which so many of them heartily despise. It is not lack of courage that makes so many of them keenly pacifist.

Who is sufficient for these things? The teachers alone certainly cannot provide all that is needed. There are fortunately some large-hearted parents who not only extend hospitality to the neighbour's child "as her mother is so often out," but who also collect a few children on Sundays and take a car full to church; but these alas! are all too few. Are there no means by which we can bridge the gap between the children in the schools and the "spiritual pastors" who, in their absence, are left with congregations whose average age rises annually?

Most of the following suggestions are based on what

is already being done in various places, and of course are not likely to succeed unless there exists in the schools and churches of any given district the real wish to co-operate.

POSSIBLE MEANS OF CO-OPERATION

(1) Representation on Youth Councils

Where there are Youth Councils, or a Youth Group in connection with a church, the secondary school nearest it should have the opportunity of contact by having a representative on the committee. In large towns especially it is difficult for Heads to know where young people coming from a very wide area are likely to find in their neighbourhood the vigorous church life that they need. ("But they need not be so dead if they *are* old," one young firebrand burst out indignantly as we walked home together from a service).

(2) Provision of Services in Line with Present Conditions

Many parents are ready to have "another shot" at religion for the sake of their children, but in Anglican churches the language of the services is full of words that have no meaning for them; there may indeed be a passing reference in the prayers to a national crisis, but the greater part of the service seems to be occupied with the repetition of phrases which seem to the unfamiliar concerned chiefly with events long past; and is there some deep undetected meaning in the words "As it was in the beginning," etc., that they must be repeated five or six times? On the Sunday after the outbreak of the recent Jewish persecutions, in one church the congregation was urged to pray that the "finances of the parish might be placed on a sound basis," and no mention was made of any happenings elsewhere. If there could be one service each Sunday in plain contemporary language, doings, spirit of which adapted to the present experience of the congregation without ornate music (somewhat on the lines of St Martin's broadcast services), there would be less difficulty in getting boys and girls to church. As a substitute for Evensong, in one place a short form of worship is used in a parish hall, followed by discussion, in groups, of religious questions, with a short address after the summing up by leaders. Those who like stay on for coffee and sandwiches and conversation. For those in lodgings this must afford a welcome solution as to how and where to spend Sunday evening, and would help them to make new

friends. Some schools are finding it possible to hold an annual service, at the beginning or end of the year, alternately in Anglican and Free Church buildings, and these services sometimes serve to make links where none existed before, especially if parents are included.

(3) More Thorough Confirmation Preparation and Subsequent Guidance in Reading

For the General Schools Examination, more than a year's preparation is given, but for Confirmation from eight to ten classes of an hour or less in many parishes. Need there be such a contrast? The children are really worried sometimes because they feel so ignorant of what it all means, and would put in more time if they had to; and they would be glad to be introduced to a book stating the essentials of the Church's Faith in language within reach of their comprehension. The Free Churches make more use than Anglicans of their older boys and girls who become Church members, but we are all too content to put up with the fact that most Christians do not "follow on to know" what they have dimly apprehended. Could parish magazines sometimes give hints as to courses of reading, and the Public Library theology section be brought out of the dark corner in which it often is, and well furnished with readable books? Librarians are generally very obliging in providing what is asked for.

(4) Need for more Trained Teachers among the Clergy

For many years now I have found that a few seniors will make time for a discussion group after school, or attend a course of lectures arranged for them. Sometimes one finds a lecturer who has such a gift for imparting knowledge that one wishes that his time could be mainly given to that. Could the dioceses not provide posts for one or two such teachers, as they do for diocesan missioners?

I believe that more training in methods of teaching is already being included in the preparation of ordinands, so doubtless the clerical voice which so irritates the rising generation will soon be heard no more. When one lecture in a course given by different people had been more warmly appreciated than the subject-matter seemed to me to merit, I asked one critical young woman why she thought it had been so much liked. She replied that it was because the

lecturer was natural and sincere and talked in a normal voice and was entirely " without starch." She did not mean without dignity; there is nothing that the young dislike more than misplaced breeziness.

(5) Week-end and Holiday Conferences

For some, short week-ends at the Diocesan House have proved more convenient than attendance at a series of lectures, and also more fruitful. As with the study circles and lectures, the numbers are not at all spectacular, but the sincerity of the thanks at the end give evidence that it was worth the time and trouble. The Camp Holidays already organized by the Federation of University Women need to be more widely known, but what is needed is something more in the nature of a vacation course of study, for there are some who do really want to make an advance in what they know about religion, though the pessimists may find that hard to believe.

(6) Need for more Prayer by the Church for Teachers and Schools

Lastly, the teacher's day is fuller now and more exhausting than it has ever been, at any rate in girls' schools. The preparation and coaching for college entrance examinations as well as for the Higher and School Certificate examinations, and the organizing of out-of-school activities, are apt to take up all waking thoughts and energies, so that when suddenly a situation arises in a child's life that calls for the wisest shepherding, the response that can be made to the need often seems miserably inadequate.

The more generously the teacher responds to the multifarious claims of school life to-day, the greater the danger of losing the sense of direction and of letting his own devotional life fade out. As St Andrew's Day has come to be regarded as the day on which the faithful pray for the work of the Church abroad, and as at Embertide we pray for those about to be ordained, could not the prayers of the Church on one day in the year be offered for those who have upon them the care, not of all the Churches, but of the children of the Church? The schools are doing their best to face up to the fresh demands made upon them by the changing world in which the children of to-day are to live out their lives, but their teachers need all available help in carrying out their divine commission.

K. E. Chester.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

The Rev. F. A. Cockin, after being vicar of St Mary the Virgin, Oxford, for five years, recently became a Canon of St Paul's.

Mr Roberts is a Master at the Royal Grammar School, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. His published works include *The Modern Mind* (1935), *Poems* (1936), and *T. E. Hulme* (1938).

The Rev. H. C. L. Heywood has been Fellow and Dean of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, since 1928. He is the author of *The Worshipping Community* (1938).

The Ven. L. S. Hunter has been Archdeacon of Northumberland since 1931; before that he was vicar of Barking. His article is based on a sermon which he preached before the University of Oxford on Trinity Sunday, 1938.

Miss Chester has been Headmistress of Putney High School, G.P.D.S.T., since 1930. She had previously been French specialist for thirteen years in secondary schools, and lecturer for four years in the Training Department of Birmingham University.

NOTES

THE CHRISTIAN AND THE NEXT WAR

The Christian has two main duties with regard to war. The first is to do all in his power, by both prayer and personal action, to remove its causes and prevent its occurrence. The second is to act rightly if and when it comes. *The following notes are concerned only with the second of these duties.*

1. Preliminaries

(i) We must distinguish between what is (*a*) of faith, (*b*) general consensus of theological experts, (*c*) personal opinion.

(ii) We are not concerned with the whole question of the Church's attitude to war (causes economic and political, working for peace, etc.), but with the concrete question, "If there is a war to-morrow, what am I to do?"

(iii) Christians cannot decide this question as the heathen do, by considerations of personal gain, national prejudices. That would simply mobilize religious emotion behind sub-Christian aims, and make religion a servant instead of a master.

2. Two Common Positions

I. *Obedience* (*Unconditional*) *to the Government.*

"The government tells me to fight, therefore (*a*) I may, and (*b*) I must." This is handing over your conscience to someone else. We all did it in the Great War.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC LIBRARY

It is argued in support of this view that the state supports us and so has a right to our obedience. Replies to this—

(i) No duty of obedience can justify a sin. If my mother tells me to steal I must refuse.

(ii) The state and the individual are not two persons. The state is made up of individuals. Our duty to the state is only a function of our mutual relations to one another. The community is not responsible to the government, but the government to it.

(iii) It is not the state that supports us, but the community. The state is only one organ of the community.

(iv) I am supported not only by my country but by the world. (Jamaican sugar, Chinese rice, Indian tea, etc.)

It is very difficult even for Christians to resist the war-mentality when propaganda is in full blast. Forewarned is forearmed.

II. *Absolute Pacifism.*

" It never can be and never has been right to engage in war." Very well argued in Hartill, *Pacifism and Christian Common Sense.*

Objections—

(i) It makes unlawfulness of war the supreme moral principle before which any other moral principle must, if in conflict, give way (*e.g.*, you must not resist a murdering, burning and raping invader).

(ii) It attempts to state a universal rule in isolation from its particular instances.

Perhaps prevalence of absolute pacifism in England is due to the fact that it is long since we have been invaded.

3. The Christian Moral Problem

In all complicated moral situations the Christian's duty is to understand his religion so thoroughly that he can pass a judgment dispassionately without adopting the canons of judgment of any secularist camps. He has his own standards of value. He needs (*a*) enlightenment, and (*b*) courage, both of which are fruits of grace.

This does not mean either (*a*) that the individual Christian can be sure of making the right choice, or (*b*) that all Christians will make the same choice; conscience is always liable to err, even when we do our best, just as a motor-car is always liable to have a hidden defect.

But you cannot solve the problem of the possibly faulty car by either (*a*) refusing to use it, (*b*) refusing to overhaul it, or (*c*) making someone else drive it.

And you cannot solve the problem of the possibly faulty conscience by either (*a*) refusing to use it, (*b*) refusing to enlighten it, or (*c*) handing it over to the government.

We need, then, to enlighten our consciences, so that we shall judge moral issues by Christian standards of value, not by pagan ones. Certain conclusions of theologians may help us in this.

4. Teaching of Theologians on War

I. War is *per se* evil and can only be ever justified *per accidens*. It is evil because—

(i) It wantonly destroys life and causes pointless suffering.

(ii) It disrupts the unity of Church and society (Smith and Schmidt receive the same Body of Christ in the morning and bayonet each other in the evening).

(iii) It punishes not only the guilty but the innocent. (Hitler or Stalin may be guilty, but the person you shoot or bomb is the peasant or the schoolgirl.)

(iv) It kills those unprepared for death and in mortal sin.

(v) It encourages many of the worst vices—*e.g.*, hate, cruelty, avarice lust—and leaves a legacy of resentment, self-righteousness, revengefulness, etc.

Wrong ideas of war thus condemned—

(*a*) War—a glorious activity of man (Mussolini's dithyrambics on the machine-gun).

(*b*) War—a fine sport.

(*c*) War—a legitimate means of extending control over backward peoples.

(*d*) War—a legitimate means of defending interests of those who are making their pile out of commercial exploitation. (The British army behind the British trader.)

II. To take part in an unjust war, which one knows or should have known to be unjust, is *murder*. The risk of one's own life only adds an element of suicide (as in case of duelling). It is just as much murder to kill a foreign soldier unjustly with a bayonet as to kill your next-door neighbour unjustly with a carving-knife. Neither my life nor my enemy's belongs to me; they are God's.

III. Conditions laid down by theologians for a just war. (N.B.—A war *must* be unjust on *one* side, and *may* be on *both*.)

(i) It must be declared by a sovereign authority to vindicate an undoubted right.

(ii) There must be no inter- or supra-national authority competent to decide the issue. (Query—League of Nations, Papacy ?)

(iii) All possible attempts at arbitration must have been made and have failed.

(iv) It must be morally certain that the losses, to the belligerents, the world as a whole, and religion, will not outweigh the advantages of winning.

(v) Only just sufficient force must be used, and the innocent and non-combatants spared all possible suffering.

(vi) There must be a considerable probability of winning.

The professional soldier, if in real doubt, may obey orders, but he *must* examine the justice of the cause, and if convinced of its injustice refuse to fight. The duty of examination is far more binding on other people.

5. Can a Modern War be Just?

Many Christians deny that conditions (iv) and (v) can be fulfilled to-day, in view of horrible methods, indiscrimination, and economic disorganization. Another war may mean collapse of civilization.

This is the position of the organization, largely composed of R.C. laymen, called PAX (see *Christendom*, December, 1936). "Though the use of force for the vindication of an undoubted right is in some circumstances and under some conditions allowable to mankind, both individually and collectively, nevertheless under the conditions of to-day in all wars waged between nations for national ends the moral and physical evils involved must enormously exceed any possible legitimate gains by either side. . . For this and other reasons such wars are morally unjustifiable." (Note the ambiguous phrase "national ends.")

This is a relative pacifism. Many who think themselves absolute pacifists are probably relative ones.

Again, has a government the right to its subject's military services if it withholds (Germany, Russia) or allows others to withhold (England) information on which the question of the justice of a war turns?

In peace time news is controlled by political, and even more by economic, financial and personal influences. In war time it is controlled by censorship.

6. Can We Trust Our Government?

If we have not the facts, can we trust the government to decide?

Remember—

(*a*) English institutions, like foreign ones, are under original sin.

(*b*) Even honest governments get pushed by economic and personal influences. (Contributors of party funds, Bank of England.)

(*c*) Abroad we are known as *Albion perfide*. ("We English look on our foreign policy as rather stupid, but transparently honest." "Do you? We look on it as diabolically clever and completely unprincipled.")

(*d*) Rescuing small or weak nations is often humbug. (Belgian Congo? Belgium in 1914? Why are we in China? What about the Assyrians?)

(*e*) Average foreigner thinks the same about his country as we think about ours. (Two Frenchmen: "What I can't stand about the English is that they are so sure they are the finest people in the world." "Why should that worry you? You think the same about the French." "Yes, but that's different. We *are* the finest people.")

7. The Individual's Responsibility

We have to decide each case for ourselves *as Christians*. This is difficult, not because Christianity is inadequate to guide us, but because so many relevant facts are withheld. All Christians will not decide the same way in most cases; but the important thing is that they should decide the matter according to the Christian scale of values—*e.g.*, men matter more than things, and things than money; character matters more than material comfort; etc.

The things, if any, that a Christian will think worth fighting for are not those that a pagan will think worth fighting for. The things a Christian will think are the real evils of war are not the things a pagan will think are the real evils.

What matters most is not that we should necessarily come to a different decision from the pagan, but that we should be seen to be coming to it on different grounds; not that we should necessarily come to the same conclusion as other Christians, but that we should be seen to be coming to our different decisions on the same grounds. Thus we shall be making an act of *witness*. And then—

8. If We Refuse to Fight—

We must be prepared to suffer, not only physically (firing squad, imprisonment, etc.) but spiritually too.

Have we a right in this case to receive food, etc., from the community? I think so, because our right to food, etc., comes from the fact that we are ready to do our proper share in the community's rightful activities, not that we are ready to do any old dirty job, such as an unjust war.

9. And if We Fight—

(Which includes indirect assistance—*e.g.*, munition work.)

In what spirit shall we fight—*i.e.*, in what spirit shall we kill our fellow-sinners?

Clearly not in the spirit that governments at war foster. We cannot whitewash everyone on our own side and blacken everyone on the enemy's. We shall see that the causes of war are greed and pride (our own sins !!), *plus* much (more or less culpable) blindness and stupidity. While convinced our cause is just (for otherwise we should not be fighting), we shall recognize that our opponents think the same about theirs, and will not forget

that we may be wrong. We shall not consider ourselves as avenging angels and enemy subjects as devoted to Satan; we shall see them as, on the average, just about as sinful as we ourselves. We shall shoot our fellow-communicant, not as wielding God's judgment on the ungodly, but penitently recognizing that sin is the sort of thing that makes this relationship between Christians necessary. That is, we shall see how horrible sin is—our own included. *It must needs be that offences come, but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!* We shall see both ourselves and our enemies offered as victims in reparation for sin in union with the Passion of Christ. Then, perhaps, we shall see a war which will end war.

10. Conclusion

This does not make everything easy—it is not meant to, but it may protect us from the usual wartime behaviour of Christians of throwing their religion to the winds and rushing off to follow the pagan lead, of acting as Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, etc., first and Christians a long way after. For, like our Master, *we have a baptism to be baptized with, and how shall we be straitened till it be accomplished!*

E. L. Mascall.

COMMENT ON PERIODICALS

(*a*) Theological

The *Expository Times*[1] for October celebrates the fiftieth year of its publication, and promises a series of articles entitled "After Fifty Years," in which month by month an expert will describe the advances made in various departments of theology. The series opens with an admirable article by Professor Vincent Taylor on "The Gospel and the Gospels," in which he sets out, with the concise lucidity that we have learned to associate with all his work, the progress and conclusions of the last fifty years of Gospel criticism.—The October number of *Œcumenica*[2] contains an article by Professor Goudge on the doctrine and unity of the Church, starting from a criticism of the work of Moehler, particularly on the ground that he ignores the Israelite cradle of the Church. An important essay by Fr Hebert follows on "The Authority of Scripture and Tradition."—The *Congregational Quarterly*[3] for October has a centenary article on A. M. Fairbairn by Dr W. B. Selbie. Mr Manning contributes an article on the Hymns of Isaac Watts, who lived through the period when dissent was an offence at law into the time of toleration; he became a pioneer of the new fashion in hymns in the early eighteenth century, when the old prejudice against

[1] T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh. 10d. monthly. [2] S.P.C.K. 1s. quarterly. [3] Independent Press, London. 2s. 6d. quarterly.

them as popish and unscriptural had passed. His book therefore is a laboratory of experiments, only some of which can be called successful by modern standards. He was a seventeenth- rather than an eighteenth-century writer, and therefore preserves certain quaintnesses, not yet smoothed out of our language by the tastes of the eighteenth century. Watts preserves also many of the greatnesses of the seventeenth century, but above all, perhaps, the cosmic view, as opposed to the individualism of Wesley and later pietists.—To the October *International Review of Missions*[1] Professor Quick has contributed an essay on "The Present Situation in Christian Theology," in which he places modern movements of thought in their historical context. His premiss is that the history of Christian theology is the record of attempts, never wholly successful, to reconcile two conflicting methods of interpretation, the Hebraic and the Hellenic. The Hebrew heritage is a philosophy of history, the idea that historical events are being directed towards a goal, the realization of which will somehow explain or make up for the manifest evils of the present. It was the transformation of that idea to fit a mainly Hellenic humanism which produced the one unquestioned dogma of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—namely, the philosophic doctrine of evolution. The school of theological thought, however, which now dominates continental Protestantism disputes all the fundamentally Hellenic assumptions of liberalism. To the Christian Hellenist, the life of Jesus is the supreme symbol through which the eternal goodness is apparent. While Christian orthodoxy can never be satisfied with the adequacy of that as an interpretation of its message, why should we rush to the opposite extreme of maintaining that God's decisive act in Jesus Christ cannot reveal Him to the reason and conscience of mankind at all? The neo-Hebraists have failed to see that, just at the very moment when they are denouncing every human ideal of truth and goodness in order to extol the majesty of God alone, they have in fact become the creatures of a very human and temporary Zeitgeist. They are in grave danger of fashioning a God after the image of the anti-humanistic despotisms which on earth they repudiate.

RONALD LUNT.

(*b*) LITERARY

If theology is not meaningless as the science of God and of man made in His image, then literature and dogma will each provide a running commentary on the other, a commentary which who runs may read. In that case there will be significance in the line to be traced from the Trinitarianism of Chaucer or Dante, through the Semi-Arianism of Milton, to the Anything-arianism of Tennyson. It will be possible thus to see in a Recall to Religion, not a summons to an exotic emotionalism super-

[1] Oxford University Press. 3s. quarterly.

imposed on life, but a recall to natural living. In such a recall the Church will not hold the monopoly, and that is cause for joy, not for jealousy. It is encouraging, therefore, that in an article in the September number of *Scrutiny*[1] (a Review of poetry and literary criticism), Mr James Smith can draw a parallel between Baudelaire's genuine acceptance of good and evil (as distinct from his occasional lapses into " diabolism " of the Manichean sort, which was a bad contemporary fashion) and Bishop Butler's doctrine, that human nature is not " one simple, uniform thing," and is dependent, for its happiness and misery, indeed for its very existence, on an external world. Thus, Baudelaire " is not of the Puritans," and in the same way is really to be distinguished from the Satanists, " who are inverted Puritans," for they " claim to prohibit what they nevertheless enjoy." While their enjoyments are " by definition disorderly," Baudelaire's enjoyments always " depend upon the possibility of order." The possibility of order is not irrelevant to theology, and is illustrated elsewhere in this periodical. Witness Mrs Leavis's article " Caterpillars of the Commonwealth Unite !" in which she counts Virginia Woolf's *Three Guineas*, everywhere acclaimed a golden piece of feminist emancipation, and finds it mere counterfeit coinage. " Mrs Woolf wants the women of her class to have the privileges of womanhood without the duties and responsibilities traditionally assumed by them, and to have the advantages of a man's education without being subsequently obliged, as nearly all men are, to justify it." The book is thus revealed as a sex-complacent, irresponsible piece of suffragette snobbishness; and its irresponsibility is precisely due to the non-natural and disorderly conceptions of feminine relationships and feminine vocation upon which it rests.—It may seem a devious route from the stern and almost ascetic analysis of *Scrutiny* to the more tenuous aspiration of *The Adelphi*.[2] But in an interesting essay on " Pacifism and the Christian Tradition " in the November issue by its ex-editor, J. Middleton Murry, there is discernible a similar concern for the natural order which is worth noting. No longer, says Mr Murry, do Christian pacifists appeal with a fanatical perfectionism to the Sermon on the Mount: " It is the workaday Christian conscience—the Christian conscience that is in a sense natural to every man—the Christian conscience which every man knows when he denies—that is appalled by modern war." And so his conclusion strikes out beyond mere pacifism to that region where theology and poetry can be seen working at the same task: " What pacifism has to do in the world to-day is simple: the simple action of our Lord when ' He set a little child in the midst of them.' "

W. R. Jarrett-Kerr.

[1] Deighton, Bell and Co., Cambridge. 2s. 6d. quarterly.
[2] Ed. M. Plowman; pub. at 12, Woodside, Erskine Hill, N.W.11.

SURVEYS

(A) PHILOSOPHY

THE publication in the latter part of last year of the first two parts of the *International Encyclopædia of Unified Science*[1] is significant of the influence which the doctrines of those commonly known as Logical Positivists have now got upon current philosophical speculation, and of the way in which in the past five or six years the whole face of European philosophy has changed. Our own philosophical climate, traditionally unresponsive at short notice to changes of weather on the Continent, has greatly altered, so that we find many philosophers conceiving of their mission in a way which is without parallel in our previous history. The movement is " positivist " in the traditional sense of that term—*i.e.*, it will have nothing to do with metaphysics; the issues which have been in the centre of attention for the classical exponents of the philosophy of religion, and the problems which have fallen within the scope of the *philosophia perennis*, are pronounced insoluble. It is at last established, we are informed, that philosophy can tell us absolutely nothing about God, the human soul, the reality or otherwise of the external world, because analysis has revealed that such issues are altogether beyond its competence. Indeed, it goes a good deal further. It would have us believe that the problems which European philosophy has set itself from Thales of Miletus onwards are meaningless. They turn out, when carefully examined, to be nonsense, more properly " nonsense " in inverted commas.

Some who meet with these doctrines for the first time may say that they have heard that tale or something like it before. The name " Positivism " conjures up the grandiose and, in these days, probably very little studied systems of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. But inspection will soon show great differences between the old and the new types of Positivism. The especial mark of the new Positivism is to be discovered in its method rather than in its conclusions. It sets out from the analysis of language, and contends that the key to the central issues of philosophy must be discovered in the structure and use made of it. Thus Mr Ayer in expounding his program writes: " The fruitlessness of attempting to transcend the limits of possible sense-experience will be deduced, not from a psychological hypothesis concerning the actual constitution of the human mind, but from the rule which determines the literal significance of language."

[1] Vol. I., No. 1: " Encyclopædia and Unified Sciences." By O. Neurath, N. Bohr, J. Dewey, B. Russell, R. Carnap, C. W. Morris. Vol. I., No. 2: " Foundations of the Theory of Signs." Cambridge Univ rsity Press, for the University of Chicago Press, 1938. 4s. 6d. each.

The circumstances which directed the attention of these philosophers to the structure of language are as follows. Early in the present century Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead made, as is well known, a thoroughgoing attempt to wrestle with the foundations of mathematics, and they claimed to have succeeded in showing that the whole of arithmetic could be deduced from the principles of logic. They tried to show that the propositions of arithmetic and logic could be expressed in a common set of symbols, so that it was not possible to say where logic ended and arithmetic began. In the first decade of this century all seemed to be going exceedingly well, and between the years 1910 and 1913 Russell and Whitehead published their *Principia Mathematica,* a work of monumental research, with a highly elaborate set of symbolically expressed deductions, obtained from a strictly limited collection of " primitive ideas " and " primitive propositions."

But it was not long before this edifice began to reveal at least one serious crack. It was observed that the account of mathematics it expounded could not be deduced without recourse to an axiom known as the Axiom of Reducibility. Nothing need be said of it in the present connexion beyond remarking that intrinsically it seemed a quite satisfactory axiom. The objection to its use in *Principia Mathematica* was solely that it was not deducible from the premisses which underlay *Principia Mathematica,* and hence, if it were true, it could be so only by what F. P. Ramsey described as a " happy accident." It was simply the principle that any claim to have achieved a form of complete " autarchy " will not permit of the import of even a single necessary product from abroad. The flaw was generally admitted, and it was in the attempt to remedy it that Dr Ludwig Wittgenstein—a German, who has now over a long period been domiciled at Cambridge—developed his characteristic doctrines.

Wittgenstein proposed to remedy the defect by the use of a new method. Whereas Russell, especially in the earlier stages of his ever-changing philosophic doctrines (*i.e.*, after the abandonment of his very first love, Bradleyan idealism), was primarily interested in the " ideas " to which the symbols pointed—holding, in fact, what was virtually a Platonic idealism about the reality of numbers—Wittgenstein tried to get out of the difficulties by examining the symbols themselves. There seemed good grounds for this, since the three volumes of *Principia Mathematica* were made up almost exclusively of symbols, with only a minimum of connecting text; and it therefore appeared reasonable to suppose that the study of the structure of symbols might provide the key to the mysteries of logic, and with it those of the other sciences, and explain why the Axiom of Reducibility was unavoidable. But what are symbols but a form of language, an artificial language admittedly, but a language which had the peculiar excellence that it could be used

with great exactitude ? By what was literally an epoch-making move, the interest changed from the study of meaning to the study of language.

In 1922 Dr. Ludwig Wittgenstein published the first edition of his views in a book of exceptional obscurity, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. His ideas were taken up and developed by a number of German and Viennese philosophers particularly concerned with the structure of scientific theory, and thus Logical Positivism came into being; and, though there are considerable differences among them in matters of detail, all agree in emphasizing the central importance of the structure of language for the solution of such philosophic problems as the complete rejection of metaphysics allows to survive. The English reader who wants a brief and lucid exposition of their doctrines by an uncompromising advocate of them should consult Mr A. J. Ayer's brilliant *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936). He may also consult the late Moritz Schlick's *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Vienna, 1938), some of which are in English. Dr Hans Reichenbach's *Experience and Prediction* (1938) may be added as another very important work, while, for a more technical defence of the subject, with a working-out of its symbolic expression, there is Dr Rudolf Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language* (E.T., 1937).

The Logical Positivists have had a full measure of missionary zeal. The two sentences which follow—they are the first two sentences of Mr Ayer's book—are a foretaste of the self-confident and propagandist attitude of a keen advocate: " The traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful. The surest way to end them is to establish beyond question what should be the purpose and method of a philosophical enquiry." The exponents of these doctrines have no doubt that they are inaugurating a new era in thought, in which it will be possible to show on the basis of linguistic analysis that all the issues of historic metaphysics are meaningless and that once the superfluous furniture has been got rid of, philosophy can be brought at long last into what Kant termed " the sure course of a science." Wranglings among philosophers will henceforward cease, and an era begin in which there will be no more differences of view among the devotees of philosophy than among those whose profession is the study of arithmetic. If occasional divergences of opinion in matters of detail reveal themselves, these must be explained as due to miscalculations which a recalculation will speedily eliminate.

For those possessed by these optimistic convictions as to what the human intellect, unaided by supernatural assistance, could achieve, it was eminently desirable that a work on the Foundations of Science—*i.e.*, the only part of knowledge which could properly be called such—should be brought into

being to set forth the established *data*. Such a work would provide us with the one and only answer to any question relevant to the structure of science that we should put to it and enable us, in the way that we discard all editions of Bradshaw except the current one, to dispense with all the false theories of science by which men were held captive till the light dawned. The classical speculations on the nature of science from the Ionians downwards would in future possess merely historical interest, and be suitable subjects, *e.g.*, for letters to *The Times* in the silly season. Plato, Aristotle, Proclus, Descartes, Leibniz, J. S. Mill, Mach, Whitehead, Meyerson, and dozens of others might perhaps continue to claim the attention of a few antiquaries, but the presuppositions upon which they based their doctrines would be so definitely outmoded that their work would be rendered useless for the solution of living issues. With the passage from darkness to light which marked the early thirties of the twentieth century, the possibility for an *Encyclopædia* which should once for all settle these age-long problems was conceived, and towards the end of the year of grace 1938 the first two *fasciculi* at last appeared.

Unfortunately, the carrying into effect of the project of bringing philosophy into the sure course of a science has proved a rather more difficult business than was anticipated when the *Encyclopædia* was planned in 1935. In the same way as the phenomenological movement, which under Husserl set out to achieve a similar end, soon lost its unity, the Logical Positivists are becoming divided on matters of fundamental importance. One may contrast Mr Ayer's two opening sentences, quoted above, with the more modest program attached to these *fasciculi*, which informs us that " the wish to inspire impartiality has led to a selection of collaborators with somewhat different points of view. . . . For these and other reasons there will be a certain divergence of opinion within the wider set of agreements which give unity to the work." This is not exactly the sort of thing we should expect to read in a preface to a co-operative treatise on the elements of arithmetic or Euclidean geometry. They show that the task of obtaining radical unity about the foundations of science is proving a far harder task than was anticipated.

Limits of space do not allow in this present survey more than this very general account of much the most influential movement in current philosophy. It is *prima facie* a destructive force, and it has therefore been necessary in a preliminary survey to concentrate on its negative aspects and to emphasize its limitations. Still less has there been an opportunity to examine its doctrine of theological statements as purely expressive and evocative, a subject about which something can be discovered from Professor H. H. Price's article on " Logical Positivism and Theology " in *Philosophy* for July, 1935. But

it may be suggested that the crudeness of many of its metaphysical doctrines should not blind those who find them totally unacceptable to the seriousness of the aims which those who have come under the spell of its doctrines are setting before themselves, or the importance of the issues with which it is concerned. The belief that the discovery of philosophic truth is a co-operative vocation, which demands the closest attention to minute problems—and for some branches of the field considerable equipment in the technicalities of mathematics and the several sciences such as few of us possess—may in many quarters be an unwonted one. What is quite certain is that it is high time that philosophical theology came to pay more attention to it than it seems to have done as yet. In later instalments of this survey it is intended to continue to give special prominence to its progress, and particularly to those aspects of it which are of immediate relevance to the Christian theologian, since knowledge of its aims and methods is a necessary preliminary to the harder task of criticism and construction.[1]

F. L. Cross.

(B) SOME TRENDS IN AMERICAN THEOLOGY

It is no exaggeration to say that within the last decade (or perhaps even less) the entire spirit of American theology has changed. In a sense this fact is a reflection of a profound change which has come over the mentality of the American people as they have faced an economic and social situation almost unparalleled in their history. It is a long way from what have been called " the halcyon days of Mr Coolidge " to the post-depression and the recession years of Mr Roosevelt. And the growing distrust and fear in world politics and international affairs have had their share as well in this new orientation of American thought.

The Episcopal Church in America has not been unaffected by the change; but it has felt that change rather less than other religious bodies, notably the well-established Protestant denominations. The reason for this is very simple. Most " official " Anglican theology in America has been in line with the historic doctrine of the Church (one might say sometimes too much in line !); and therefore Episcopalians have not known the swing to an ultra-liberalism such as marked the Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, " Christian " (Disciples of Christ) and Baptist groups. On the other hand, the contemporary reaction in the thought of these groups in the direction of an ultra-conservatism

[1] At the last moment a third fasciculus of the *Encyclopædia* has become available. This is Vol. I, No. 5: " Procedures of Empirical Science," by V. F. Lenzen. Also 4s. 6d.

of a neo-Barthian type has also been alien to the genius of the Episcopal Church, and so has not had too much influence upon its theology.

But the Episcopal Church, one must point out, counts less in America than in England—at least numerically, although its influence on thought is rather wide since its membership includes large numbers of wealthy and "intellectually" prominent people. Protestantism is far in the lead in the United States, with the Roman Church claiming the second largest group of adherents. And Protestantism in America seems to represent in some strange fashion the mentality of the great masses of citizens of this vast land of 125,000,000 souls. This may be said without for a moment questioning the fact that an intelligently presented modern-minded but not "modernistic" Catholicism, such as the Anglican communion can offer, wins the loyalty of large numbers, especially among the younger people of the country, who feel the need for that element of tradition, institutionalism and sacramentalism, which Catholicism possesses.

It is perhaps precisely because that need is felt that the first of the contemporary trends in American theology (always predominantly Protestant, one must recall) has become so prominent. That is the movement towards the church-idea. This may not take orthodox forms—indeed, in most cases it does not; but it represents an endeavour to secure fellowship with the past and a united front against non-Christian forces in the present. Such a trend is noticeable on every hand. One of the most recent examples has been the series of essays in *Christendom* (the American journal published in Chicago), in which Dr C. C. Morrison has urged the necessity for a return to the Catholic "idea," and has stated his own conviction that the Church is "the carrier of salvation"; salvation is found in the fellowship, and not apart from it, he tells us, and religion is not an affair between an individual and his God, but involves a society as well. Jesus' chief work was the creating of the Church, however that may be conceived.

Dr Cyril Richardson of Union Seminary has recently published a book on *The Church through the Centuries* which seeks to aid those who in recovering the church-idea are requiring some historical background for their conviction. Professor Bennett of Auburn has written about the value of fellowship, and the "historical continuity" of the faith through the Church. Dr Walter Marshall Horton of Oberlin, in several books (notably an essay in *Religious Realism* and his volume *Realistic Theology*), has been specially concerned to stress this point. Professor W. Adams Brown and Dean Henry P. VanDusen of Union Seminary have also written on the subject. One might list many others, but these names are suggestive.

Precisely what the church-idea involves, and how it is to be

embodied, are questions that have not yet received the attention they deserve. One notes that the Catholic conception of the Church as more than spiritual, the stress on its human and even material side, has not been fully appreciated—for some, the Church appears to be only a " second best," although in the familiar words of the late Alfred Fawkes a " necessary evil." The value of the apostolic tradition (not necessarily in its narrower sense, but in its wider meaning of a continuity of " apostolic " teaching) is not always understood. But there is a keen desire to share in the funded experience of the Christian centuries, and to enter into the significance of the Church's doctrinal teaching. Tradition is no longer merely a term of reproach; our ancestors are once more " being given a vote."

At the moment, such interest appears not to extend far behind the Reformation, or at best the Scholastics. Perhaps it will go back to the Fathers when the more recent fields have been explored. There is little doubt that American theology would profit by a close study of the Greek Fathers, a subject so far largely left to historical specialists in American schools.

The second notable trend may be called, in the words of Dean VanDusen and Dr Horton, the movement towards a " realistic theology." By this is meant a turning away from the extraordinarily optimistic outlook which characterized the America of a decade ago, towards a recognition of the real *facts* of human nature and the world. The sunny " Pollyanna " theology, which saw man gradually growing from good to better and presently to true perfection here and now, was beautifully epitomized in the famous *credo* which expressed belief in " the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, the leadership of Jesus, and the progress of man upward and onward for ever." Redemption by character, and that a simple process indeed; a God who was described by a critic as like a " cosmic escalator "; a rosy view of the future of human society which included the belief that the Kingdom of God was being built by men here on earth and would shortly be completed in its fullness—all these idols have fallen. A more radical, and therefore a more realistic, insight into the nature of man and the world has followed, and with this an emphasis on traditional doctrines such as the Incarnation and Atonement.

Here again, one must mention some of the leaders. Chief among them is Reinhold Niebuhr, whose incisive criticism has destroyed the older liberalism almost completely. Paul Tillich, R. L. Calhoun, Dr Bennett, Professor McGiffert—these are just a few who may be named. Man has a terrible fissure in his innermost self; the world is never to be the area in which perfection can be attained, since society carries with it tendencies that make for sin and immorality, even when man is moral; God is " holy " and " other," even though He has made Himself

accessible to us and offered man redemption; this is the message which comes from our newer theologies. Influenced by Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Karl Heim, and now by the new translations of Kierkegaard, American thinkers are becoming "realistic"—in some instances, almost pessimistic about man and his world. Pessimism is alien to the American temperament, however, and one may expect (and in some quarters, one sees) a swing towards a more central position—notably in the work of Dr Horton, who recognizes the evil in human nature and in the world, but is strong in insisting on the goodness of creation essentially, even if he must admit its existential perverseness and defection from God.

A third tendency may be mentioned. It is the growing interest in English and Continental thought. Although there was some criticism of a recent book which urged Americans to acquaint themselves more deeply with what is being done in other lands ("on the firing-line," as it was said), the advice has been acted upon; and it is remarkable to observe how many essays appear in our journals from foreign writers, and how much attention is paid to the theology of Temple, for instance, and to Berdiaeff, Boulgakoff, Heim, Althaus as well as Barth and Brunner. The fact that Tillich and Brunner are now teaching in America has doubtless added impetus to this movement. "Œcumenical theology" is the new watchword, in the sense of "super-national" and "super-denominational."

There is still the old-fashioned liberal American Protestant school. But even among its chief representatives (in the academic sphere, men like Wieman) there is no longer the blindness which led to a failure to recognize the mystery of life and of man, the transcendence of God, and the sinful tendency and division in the soul of man. Popular preachers like Dr Harry E. Fosdick preach sermons on "Beyond Modernism," and they are not voices crying in the wilderness.

A final word may be added on another trend—not so prominent perhaps, but real and significant. Among many of the younger men in universities, in literary fields, and in the arts—and including also some of the younger scientists—there has been a growing sense of the central position of the Anglican communion. Paul Elmer More was their nestor; and in his train have followed other and younger thinkers who have found in Anglican Catholicism, usually of a "liberal" type (not in the old-fashioned sense, but rather modern-minded and non-obscurantist), a type of Christianity which they can embrace with their whole hearts. The book *Affirmations* (published this autumn) represents this group. Here are a half-dozen professors, artists, writers and critics who speak as Anglicans, but who speak also as modern Americans. And they are only a few of the many who might be mentioned. The danger is that this will be a movement amongst the *intelligentsia;* but if it can make itself

felt more widely, it may not be without importance for the future. At any rate, it is significant that in a country with an almost entirely Protestant outlook, this type of Catholicism makes a wide appeal to better-informed minds.

Some Suggested Reading

Reinhold Niebuhr: *Moral Man and Immoral Society ; An Interpretation of Christian Ethics ; Beyond Tragedy.*

Cyril C. Richardson: *The Church through the Centuries.*

Christendom: Articles in 1937-38 numbers by Dr C. C. Morrison.

John C. Bennett: *Christianity and Our World ; Social Salvation.*

R. L. Calhoun: *God and the Common Life ;* Essay in *Oxford Conference Report.*

Paul Tillich: *Interpretation of History ; Religious Realism.*

Walter Marshall Horton: *Realistic Theology ; Contemporary English Theology ; Contemporary Continental Theology ;* Essay in *Religious Realism ; Growth of Religion* (with H. N. Wieman).

Henry P. VanDusen: *The Plain Man Seeks for God ;* Essay in *The Church through Half a Century ; God in these Troubled Times.*

Various Authors: *The Nature of Religious Experience.*

William Adams Brown: *The Church: Catholic and Protestant; Pathways to Certainty; Beliefs that Matter.*

Edited by B. I. Bell: *Affirmations.*

W. Norman Pittenger.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DIVINITY OF JESUS CHRIST. A Study in the History of Christian Doctrine since Kant. Hulsean Lectures, 1936. By J. M. Creed. Cambridge University Press. 6s.

The purpose of these lectures is " to clarify the high theme of the doctrine of our Lord's Person in the Church of this our age," and the method employed is " a process of appreciating and differing from the chief theological leaders of the age which now lies behind us." With these ends in view Dr Creed gives a critical account of the chief tendencies in Christology during the nineteenth century. He is conscious that, in the midst of the reaction from liberalism and the recovery of the idea of revelation, theologians to-day are in danger of ignoring some of the lessons of the nineteenth century. These lectures give a timely warning.

Dr Creed's starting-point is the beginning of the nineteenth century, since at that time the idea of an authoritative revelation " was thrown into the melting-pot." The study of Christianity was now undertaken not in terms of a divine oracle, but in terms of human experience and historical inquiry. Theologians arose who, starting from these newer standpoints, vindicated Christian belief in ways which were relevant to the intellectual needs of the day. Thus Schleiermacher's exposition of religion in terms of feeling and of the Incarnation in terms of the God-consciousness of Jesus Christ did (in spite of its obvious defects, especially in the treatment of history) succeed in vindicating a positive Christianity without drawing upon those ideas of infallibilist revelation which were ceasing to cut any ice. The idea of " religion in general " is not to be rejected (as in Dr Brunner's *The Mediator*) as utterly incompatible with a specific revelation; the former can prepare the way for men's acceptance of the latter, and the phrase *Christus Consummator* well sums up the doctrine of Schleiermacher and of other writers of the Romantic school.

From Schleiermacher, Dr Creed passes on to Hegel. Here, too, the defects are plain; his doctrine of the Person of Christ was rather an interpretation of the whole process of history than a Christology. But (besides grasping the importance of the Cross in a way which Schleiermacher had missed) Hegel recalled an important element in Christianity—namely, the relation of the Son of Man to mankind; and he confronted Christian thinkers with a problem that is still insistent—namely, the relation of the Incarnation to " process " or evolution. Ritschl likewise provokes both criticism and appreciation. Dr Creed shows how the Ritschlian conception of the Kingdom of God broke down in the face of a more scientific study of the Gospels, and yet he bids us not to pass Ritschl by. " I cannot resist the impression that in his reading of the Gospels Ritschl saw and firmly grasped something that is really there, though it is now the

fashion in some quarters to ignore it, or at the least not to emphasize it."

Meanwhile traditional orthodoxy was being forced to meet the challenge of the nineteenth century. Liddon (to whose Bampton Lectures Dr Creed pays an interesting tribute) fought with purely traditionalist weapons, while the kenotic school attempted to combine Chalcedonian orthodoxy with a full recognition of the human limitations of Jesus. But the nineteenth century was questioning not only the interpretation of Christology, but the whole idea of a unique Incarnation. For men were now regarding history not as enclosed within a divine and Biblical framework (Creation, the Fall, the Incarnation, the Last Judgment), but as a vast and frameless field for free investigation and a field within which the Bible itself is a part like other parts. Thus, when the Bible is thrown into the wide stream of general history, the question arises " in what sense is Christianity unique ?" Criticizing Troeltsch, Dr Creed insists that the New Testament is impregnated with the claim to be saying something unique and necessary for all mankind.

In the last lecture Dr Creed draws some constructive conclusions. He sees in the Chalcedonian formula a great value of a negative kind—the exclusion of misleading interpretations of the Person of Christ. He summarizes three outstanding thoughts in the New Testament which must claim a place in a true doctrine—belief in God as creative mind and will, belief that Jesus reveals the eternal God in time, and belief that He who was Jesus Christ was also the divine agent in the creation of the world. He insists also that the doctrine of Jesus as Saviour is inseparable from the doctrine of Jesus as Judge. In all these ways Dr Creed points us toward a Christology which is far beyond " liberalism," and shows us that the idea of revelation is returning. But he bids us learn from the lessons of the nineteenth century that revelation cannot rightly be thought of as a parabola touching the world at a tangent, since it has a real relation to " genuine human experiences which are within the world." The poems of Wordsworth still possess a Christian significance; and the true doctrine, like the Apocalypse, links together the confession " Worthy is the lamb that was slain " with the hymn of all creation.

Dr Creed has given us a deeply interesting book, and many readers will feel that they have never read a more fascinating account of the trend of thought during the last century. He makes good his case that the study of this period is vital for an understanding of the tasks of theology to-day. As regards these tasks it may be that the kenotic school has more to contribute than Dr Creed is willing to allow. If his criticisms of kenoticism on pp. 77-80 are valid when applied to the treatment of the doctrine by Thomasius, Fairbairn, Gore in his earlier writings, and Mackintosh, it is doubtful if they apply to the somewhat

different treatment of the doctrine in Forsyth's *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*. Unlike the "classical" kenoticists, Forsyth insisted that before we can think out our Christology we must "christianize" our conceptions of divine omnipotence and omniscience and reconsider the meaning of these attributes in terms of love and self-limitation. When this is done, the weakness and the ignorance of the Christ on earth appear not as the abandonment of omnipotence and omniscience by the eternal Word, but as the manifestation of these attributes in their ethical meaning. Kenotic doctrine of this type, in contrast with the "classical" type, is strongly defended by Dr Quick in his recent *Doctrines of the Creed*; and it may prove of service in the theological problems which this generation has to face. A. M. Ramsey.

Cuthbert Tunstal. By Charles Sturge. Longmans. 21s.

A biography of Tunstal has long been awaited, and a justifiable impatience on the part of students of English ecclesiastical history is now more than compensated for by Mr Sturge's scholarly work. In recent years the Abbé Constant has awakened a good deal of interest in that party in the counsels of Henry VIII whom he has called the Henricians, but apart from the comprehensive studies of Muller and Janelle, treating of the various aspects of Gardiner's work, it is remarkable how few books have appeared dealing with those Catholic bishops who accepted the Royal Supremacy, and remained loyal to Henry while steadfastly opposing all attempt at doctrinal change.

Tunstal's life covers almost exactly the period of Renaissance and Reformation in England. Born in 1474, of a good family, he was given every opportunity to mix in the society of humanists and scholars both at Oxford and on the Continent. Not the least of testimonies to his character is Stapleton's statement quoted by Mr Sturge on p. 23, that More could never have too much of his company. More, himself, said of him, "while no one is better versed in all good literature, no one more strict in life and behaviour, yet no one whatever is a more delightful companion." It is hardly to be wondered at that Wolsey, always a good assessor of worth, sought out Tunstal, and employed him on more than one diplomatic mission. In 1522, Tunstal's future was settled for him when he was nominated Bishop of London. He had been in priest's orders for some twelve years already, but had so far been primarily occupied with administrative work. From this time onward he devoted himself wholeheartedly to ecclesiastical affairs, and to the conservation of Catholic doctrine. When, in 1530, he became Bishop of Durham, he automatically, by reason of the unique power wielded by the Bishops Palatine, became a person of outstanding importance.

The real problem of Tunstal's career is the apparent contradiction implied in his acceptance of Henry's Act of Supremacy in 1534, and his subsequent refusal to swear to that of Elizabeth in 1559. Mr Sturge shows convincingly that his behaviour,

far from being illogical, was based upon a definite principle. There is no real inconsistency; in his earlier years he came to appreciate the traditional nature of the control claimed by the English kings over the Church in England, and to regard the Papalism of Reginald Pole as based on unsound premises. As he told Katherine of Aragon, he was " the King's subject and vassal," and the political philosophy of Gardiner's *De Vera Obedientia* was his guide until he realized that the Royal Supremacy implied ultimately more than merely temporal jurisdiction. In his devotion to his king, he might deny the lawfulness of Katherine's position, but he could not subscribe to the 1549 Book of Common Prayer, entailing as it did an acquiescence in the royal right to amend doctrine and liturgy at will. Tunstal was more fortunate than Gardiner in that he lived to share in the new-born hopes attendant upon the accession of Mary, but he was also more unfortunate in that he was destined to see those hopes shattered before they were fulfilled, and to suffer deprivation a second time for conscience' sake. A Catholic at heart, his conformity under Henry VIII was sometimes reluctant, though springing as it did from a strong sense of obedience to authority, it was not against conscience. It must never be forgotten that he resisted the Supremacy Act with all his might in the Northern Convocation of 1531, a point which Mr Sturge might have made even more forcibly than he does on p. 179,[1] and it can only have been when temporarily reassured that no doctrinal authority was implied in the Act that he could write to Pole as he did in 1536, giving his reasons for assent to the oath in no measured terms. Mr Sturge gives certain extracts from this correspondence (pp. 207 *ff.*) which make it clear that Pole was a little pained by what he rather pardonably thinks is a slur, as inferred by Tunstal, on the martyrdoms of More and Fisher. Tunstal had, however, no intellectual sympathy with Protestantism, and even if he queried the doctrine of Transubstantiation it must be remembered that the Church was not yet bound by the Tridentine canons and that he might still justifiably hold a private opinion on that, as on certain other points. He died as he had lived, a staunch Catholic, true to the faith.

Mr Sturge evidently knows the North of England, and particularly the " Bishopric," well. His study of Tunstal as Bishop of Durham is full of interest, aided as it is by the admirable attention which the author, in his footnotes, pays to local history and topography. The study of Tunstal's relations with Bernard Gilpin, the " Apostle of the North," is particularly interesting. A very full bibliography and an exhaustive series of appendices add to the value of a book which is a model both of sound learning and excellent arrangement. BEATRICE HAMILTON THOMPSON.

[1] See A. G. Dickens, " The Northern Convocation and Henry VIII " (*Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. CXXVII, No. 253, p. 84).

TRUE HUMANISM. By Jacques Maritain. Translated by M. R. Adamson. The Centenary Press. 10s. 6d.

The evangelization of the modern world will depend very largely upon how far Christian people are ready to take seriously the two duties of prayer and action. It is not enough for the pietists to reflect that *orare est laborare* and the activists that *laborare est orare*, for neither prayer nor work will be of any use without the other. It is because of his interest and competence in both spheres that M. Maritain's writings are of such significance for Christian thought. In his *Degrees of Knowledge* he touched the heights of mystical contemplation; in the present work, the original of which was completed in 1936 and bears the title *Humanisme Intégral*, he is concerned with Christian political theory and action.

There is, he insists, only one true humanism, and it is integral, Catholic and heroic. The so-called humanism of the post-Renaissance world began by making God the guarantor of man's supremacy, continued by making Him an idea, and has ended by denying His existence. Its weakness was not that it was humanism but that it was anthropocentric. The choice now before man is between a radical atheism, which is self-destructive and unlivable (the only logical and thorough-going atheist is the suicide), and the true theocentric humanism, which is Catholicism.

Does this mean, then, a return to the Middle Ages? By no means. The Middle Ages were good as far as they went, but the one indisputable fact about them is that they have gone beyond recall. ("She was a good cook as cooks go, but, as cooks go, she went.") They lived by the ideal of the *sacrum imperium*—and died of it. Like the good Thomist that he is, M. Maritain appeals to the principle of analogy. A Christian commonwealth must embody three characteristics—it must be communal, personalist, and peregrinal (p. 127)—but the way in which these are embodied at a particular epoch will depend upon the particular historic circumstances. The Middle Ages had a conception of the temporal as Christian and *consecrational* (*sacral*, in the French); the new Christendom will conceive it as Christian and *secular* (*profane*—how difficult translation is !), and it will need a new, a "secular" style of sanctity. M. Maritain details five notes as typical of the medieval order; there will be five corresponding (not identical—that is where analogy comes in) notes in the new order. (1) The ideal of the *sacrum imperium* was maximalist, making for a monarchical unity; (2) the temporal was viewed primarily as ministerial to the spiritual, as a mere instrumental cause; (3) the institutional forces of the state were used to preserve the spiritual unity of the social body; (4) there was a diversity of "social races"; and (5) the end envisaged was the building up of a social and juridical

stronghold for God on earth (pp. 137 *sqq.*). This was a noble aim, but it failed of realization; it decayed into baroque absolutism and rationalistic liberalism, and it is no use trying to recall it.

The notes of the new Christendom will be analogous, and therefore different. (1) It will be pluralist (*i.e.*, the state will respect and preserve smaller groupings within it, non-Christian ones included); (2) in it the temporal will be autonomous, not of course as a supreme end but as an intermediary or infravalent one; (3) it will respect the freedom of persons; (4) it will establish a unity of social race, which will nevertheless not be an oversimplified equalitarianism; and (5) its aim will be the realization of a fraternal community (pp. 156 *sqq.*). It is impossible here to do justice to Maritain's treatment—it must be read in full. The Christian outlook must, he stresses, be a long-range one (*à objectif éloigné ou à longue portée*), for the new Christendom can only be established when the present capitalist order has been liquidated; this need not worry the Christian, who believes that neither man's life nor God's plan comes to an end with the death of the body. Nevertheless, Maritain has some very illuminating remarks to make about the more immediate future.

There is a need, he says, for new political formations, but these should not take the form of a "Catholic party." They will be, at any rate initially, minority groups, relying rather on the inherent power of Catholic sanity to provide the leadership that the community lacks than upon any deliberate mobilization of political force for ecclesiastical ends. And they will not try to combat the Communistic atheism that denies the existence of God by throwing in their lot with those who would turn God into an idol. If all else fails, the Christian must be ready for martyrdom, but that does not mean that he should seek it as the normal solution. To prepare by our omissions and torpor for the martyrdom of others is not heroism but sloth, and even as regards our own martyrdom we are reminded that "St Thomas More would have held it pure presumption to claim the glory of being decapitated for God before all other ways of bringing his trial to an end had been exhausted" (p. 283).

The Christian's position, like that of man in general, is tragic, but "he is not shut up in a tragedy from which there is no issue. The solution, in the spiritual order, the saints have taught him is a love stronger than the powers of hell. In the temporal order also . . . there is a solution . . . in . . . preparing the ways of a new Christendom, a new Christian order of which . . . the notion of integral humanism expresses the distinctive character." But it depends on us whether it is to be found. If we neglect our responsibility—"Hail, then, pestilence and famine! You are purer than we" (pp. 285-6).

This summary, incomplete and inadequate as it is, should at least make plain the importance of M. Maritain's book. It is one that no intelligent Christian can afford to neglect, even if

he disagrees with parts of it. It will satisfy neither the medievalists nor the Francoites; indirectly it will go far to explain the attitude of that vigorous and misrepresented group of French Catholics, of whom M. Maritain is one, who refuse to look on the Spanish tragedy as a holy war. Incidentally we may refer to the very stimulating observations made by Fr Victor White, O.P., in his review article in the November *Blackfriars*, where he points out the relevance of Maritain's insistence on the principle of analogy to current sociological controversies and gives some hard knocks to the social rigorists of the *Integration* school.

One word of criticism. M. Maritain has a rather disconcerting habit of incorporating large parts of his books in one another. Just as the major part of *Science et Sagesse* turns up again in *The Degrees of Knowledge*, so most of the material of *True Humanism* will be found in *Freedom in the Modern World*, which is in some ways an easier book to read. But it is interesting to compare the slightly different presentations.

The translation is, on the whole, excellent, and M. Maritain is not an easy writer to translate. There is, however, rather a tendency to gallicisms (*e.g.*, " interdict " for " forbid," " experience " for " experiment "). A few apparent mistranslations have been noted: p. 11, l. 8, for " his entirely " read " the whole of his "; p. 17, l. 1, for " the good life is a necessity " read " a man must live "; p. 26, l. 26, for " secular " read " agelong." And an index or a synoptic table of contents (as in the French original) would have been a great help.

E. L. Mascall.

Affirmations. By a Group of American Anglo-Catholics Clerical and Lay. Edited by Bernard Iddings Bell. Sheed and Ward. 6s.

The group numbers seven, and their purpose is apologetic. Hence it must be deemed happy that all but one are concerned in effect not so much to affirm as to argue. For if affirmation may sometimes give the faithful the illusion that they are being fortified, it does not readily impress the infidel, the pagan, or the apparently indifferent person. Unfortunately, while the theses of most are argumentative, the writers live up to the title of the book in being assertorial and indeed categoric in statement. Professor W. A. Orton affirms that the " supposed homogeneity of a supposed classless society is a myth," and only supports that affirmation by another—that " history suggests that there never will be " such a society. Yet he further affirms a page or two later that " the majority of individuals are *now* decent and kindly folk," implying a belief in progress—to date. That is perhaps why he does not see that to say that history suggests that something or other never will be begs the question of how

history can suggest anything whatever about the future. Doubts of the advent of the millennium can be based solely on what we think we apprehend to be the nature of man, and not on history. Professor W. M. Urban takes up a complaint made ten years ago by Mr Walter Lippmann—that " we moralists have failed to understand our times." He then repeatedly insists on the need for understanding, but shows neither that anyone has it, nor, if it is lacking, how it can be obtained. Mr T. O. Wedel states well enough how " modern life " diverges from Christianity, but when it comes to indicating the means whereby they might be brought to follow one and the same path he is disappointing. The late Dr Gavin—he died as the book was in the press—is able to re-define sin without mentioning responsibility. It is he who, disdaining argument, simply affirms in thought as well as in manner. In contending that beauty serves, and might serve more, as a vehicle for bringing people to religion, Mr R. A. Cram, the architect, seems to be trying unwittingly, not, of course, to sell the pass, but to give it away. Another American, Mr Allen Tate, has objected in advance to Professor F. A. Pottle's statement that " poetry *expresses* mental experiences." Mr Pottle also states that there is " a very high degree of probability," scientifically speaking, that the Resurrection did not occur. But it is not the Resurrection which can be more or less probable; either it occurred or it did not. All that can have degree is our confidence that there was or was not the Resurrection. Forty-six years ago our John Burnet wrote a book to show that " the thing we call science " came into being with the early Ionian teachers, and that book is still in vogue in England, in the United States, and on the Continent. Yet here is Mr Pottle affirming that Aristotle and Archimedes, in being addicted to scientific experiment, " were not typical of Greek mentality as a whole."

Nevertheless, Mr Pottle has written one of the two satisfactory papers in the book, explaining clearly how novelties in science fail either to strengthen or to weaken the grounds of religious faith and firmly rejecting the fancies of Matthew Arnold and of Mr I. A. Richards that the reading of poetry is a substitute for the practice of religion. The other satisfactory paper is that contributed by the editor, Canon Bell, who provides in it an admirable short description of the nature of faith.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

THE CHRISTMAS CRIB. Nesta de Robeck. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 8s. 6d.

The most significant point arising in this book is that the Christmas crib has its origins in the earliest days of Christian worship. After a rather dubious assumption that the Grotto at Bethlehem " must have been the most sacred of places to

the immediate disciples of Our Lord," the author tracks the enthusiasm of men for the nativity scene along several different paths. The first of these began in the devotions of Christians, at the site of the Nativity itself, during the first few centuries (*e.g.*, St Jerome and St Paula in the fourth century), followed by the transference of the relics from Bethlehem to Rome, and the construction there of a "Domus" chapel containing a manger.

The nativity carvings on the Græco-Roman sarcophagi (echoing the pre-Christian myths as in the Arcadian shepherd, who still plays his pipes in the cribs to-day), the transcendental Byzantine reliefs and mosaics, and later, the development of Gothic sculpture, all provided the plastic element of the crib. Its real prototype, however, is the Christmas Liturgy itself. This, involving all the imagery of the Apocryphal Gospels and the evident heartiness of the Dark Ages, became a symbolic Nativity drama centred round the manger, which was represented by the altar.

Then came St Francis of Assisi who, with his great passion for Christmas, integrated all these aspects, and in reconstructing the scene of the manger at Greccio in A.D. 1223 branded the crib right into the heart of Christianity. With the growth of the Franciscans, the crib became all part and parcel of the life of the Middle Ages, which slowly developed into the humanism of the Renaissance. The subsequent history of the crib is of its increasing complexity and decreasing spirituality, which, helped by the introduction of jointed dolls and mechanical models, led to its decline to the level of a mere toy in the nineteenth century.

To-day a crib is generally ordered by the parson for the benefit of his people, particularly the children, although even the latter (certainly the self-respecting male ones) must have difficulty in appreciating the purchase. Even the best modern cribs, as illustrated in this book, have in common with all modern "ecclesiastical art" a certain cloying sweetness calculated to make a superficial sensuous appeal to people, and there is absolutely nothing of the simplicity and austerity of which true contemporary art is capable. But the whole history of the crib, as this book emphasizes, reveals its liturgical nature, so that it should never be something made for *people*, but something done by man for *God*. Only the very best work (*i.e.*, that of true artists) is therefore fit to be put into our cathedrals for instance, and the crib recently constructed at St Paul's is a notable example.

In our little country churches where æsthetic importations are neither practicable nor desirable, let the people or the children plan and make the cribs with their own amateur hands, so that God may, as at Bethlehem, still set the Nativity *into* human life.

GILBERT N. WALTON.

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE AND THE NEW REFORMATION. Maurice Lectures for 1938. By Claude Jenkins. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Anything from the pen of so learned an historian as Professor Jenkins is sure of a welcome. Maurice has been dead for over sixty years, but the influence he exercised in the nineteenth century is still potent for good. There was something of the prophet about him, much of the social reformer, not a little of the philosopher and theologian. We might reasonably describe his work as "germinal"; from the seeds he sowed there has sprung up a goodly tree. Like all whole-hearted pioneers he had to face opposition and even obloquy; but he never flinched. He deserves to be commemorated—he and his band of zealous sympathizers—and Dr Jenkins has written a little book that is no unworthy memorial of Maurice's life-work. The volume is slight in texture (it contains the text of but three lectures), but it is good throughout. Many of its pages are occupied with quotations from Maurice's writings; and for this we are grateful: they show us what manner of man he really was. How true some of his *obiter dicta* are! Consider this, for example (on p. 39): "The real struggle will be not between Popery and Protestantism, but between atheism and Christ." A forecast, indeed, that is being fulfilled before our eyes to-day. Maurice was the mainspring of the movement known as Christian Socialism, though he repudiated the position of a party leader. Though, at times, obscure when expressing himself in his writings, he was clear enough in thought; in Christian kindliness he ever abounded. And he had the gift of vision. We are grateful to the Professor for giving us this brief but attractive monograph on the life and work of a great and good man.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: F. Dodd, *An Introduction to the Study of Christianity* (12s. 6d.); C. Duncan Jones (Ed.), *An Outline of Church History* (4s. 6d.).

BAYLIS (Worcester): W. B. Monahan, *The Psychology of St Thomas Aquinas* (3s. 6d.).

BELL: C. A. Alington, *A Reader's Guide to the New Testament* (5s.).

BLACKWELL: F. M. Hnik, *The Philanthropic Motive in Christianity* (16s.).

BOWES AND BOWES: W. W. Lucas, *The Primordial Functions of Government and the Legal Status of Sovereignty* (7s. 6d.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: Daniel-Rops, *The Poor and Ourselves* (2s. 6d.); C. de Foucauld, *Sermons in the Sahara* (2s. 6d.); Dom E. Graf, *The Church's Daily Prayer* (5s.); Vincent McNabb, *A Life of Our Lord* (6s.); E. Allison Peers, *The Church in Spain* 1737-1937 (1s.).

CENTENARY PRESS: N. Berdyaev, *Solitude and Society* (8s. 6d.).

CHURCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY (U.S.A.): E. L. Pennington, *Apostle of New Jersey: John Talbot* ($2.50).

FABER AND FABER: E. Graham Howe, *Time and the Child* (7s. 6d.)—a new edition of the book published in 1934 under the title *Morality and Religion*, reviewed in THEOLOGY in July, 1934.

HEFFER: F. W. Buckler, *The Epiphany of the Cross* (3s. 6d.).

HODDER AND STOUGHTON: A. Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination* (20s.).

LONGMANS: C. A. Alington, *A Plea for a Plan* (3s. 6d.); J. Dean, *The New Testament* (10s. 6d.); J. W. Mackail, *The Sayings of Christ* (4s. 6d.)—a new edition of a well-known book.

MACDONALD AND EVANS: W. G. De Burgh, *From Morality to Religion* (12s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN: F. C. N. Hicks, *The Fullness of Sacrifice* (7s. 6d.)—a cheap edition of an important book, reviewed in THEOLOGY in January, 1931; H. Maynard Smith, *Pre-Reformation England* (25s.).

MOHR (Tübingen): J. Fichtner, *Weisheit Salomons* (M.2.90); T. H. Robinson, *Die Zwölf Kleinen Propheten* (M.4.80).

MOWBRAY: W. H. Elliott, *Thursdays at Ten* (2s. 6d.)—Mr Elliott has his own devoted public, who will be delighted with this book; S. Harton, *A Child's Faith* (3s. 6d.); C. H. Petter, *Trial and Triumph* (2s. 6d.); A. E. Simpson, *On Sure Foundations* (2s. 6d.)—Canon Simpson is a teacher, equipped with gifts of lucidity and persuasiveness.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: G. K. A. Bell, *Randall Davidson* (21s.)—a cheap edition of this famous book, indispensable as a work of reference; reviewed in THEOLOGY on its first appearance in 1935.

PUTNAM: H. A. Studdert Kennedy, *Arise, Shine* (5s.).

SHEED AND WARD: W. Farrell, *A Companion to the Summa*, vol. ii. (10s. 6d.); E. Leen, *Why the Cross?* (7s. 6d.).

SHELDON PRESS: E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Judaism and Christianity*, vol. iii., " Law and Religion " (10s. 6d.).

SKEFFINGTON: G. Gordon, *The Life of Mastery* (3s. 6d.)—a collection of short papers by the late Bishop of Jarrow.

S.C.M. PRESS: S. de Dietrich, *Behold thy King: Meditations on the Gospels* (4s.); L. Hodgson, *The Second World Conference on Faith and Order: Edinburgh*, 1937 (10s. 6d.)—the official report; W. M. Horton, *Contemporary Continental Theology* (7s. 6d.); E. N. Mozley, *Guide to the Old Testament* (3s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Chavasse, *Parochial Sermons of Bishop Chavasse: Advent to Whitsunday* (5s.); B. F. L. Clarke, *Church Builders of the Nineteenth Century* (12s. 6d.); Minos Devine, *The Poet Preacher of Vere Street* (2s. 6d.); R. S. T. Haslehurst, *Church of England Doctrine*, two parts (2s. each)—study books on the Doctrinal Report; E. R. A. Kermack, *Life unto God* (5s.); J. R. Lumb, *Power and Witness* (2s. 6d.)—the third annual Bible Class book; K. D. Mackenzie (Ed.), *The Liturgy* (4s.); D. Stephen, *Outline History of the Christian Church* (2s. 6d.); A. W. Wade-Evans, *Nennius' History of the Britons* (7s. 6d.).

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher